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Sijoittajien tarkkaavaisuuden rajallisuutta ja sen vaikutuksia pääomamarkkinoihin on tutkittu 
enenevissä määrin viime vuosien aikana. Aiempien tutkimuksien mukaan havaitut viiveellä 
tapahtuvat markkinareaktiot useisiin yrityksien julkistuksiin liittyen, saattavat selittyä sijoittajien 
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Tässä tutkielmassa testaan sijoittajien rajallisen tarkkaavaisuuden vaikutuksia kontekstissa, 
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hinta- ja volyymireaktiot ovat hillittyjä, kun samoina päivinä esitetään korkeampi määrä 
osavuosittaisia tulosjulkistuksia. Lisäksi testaan Louis and Sun (2010) esitetyn sijoittajien 
tarkkaamattomuuden hypoteesin mukaan, mikäli markkinareaktio on hillitty, kun 
osakevaihtosulautumiset julkistetaan perjantaisin. 
Löydän osittain näyttöä hillityn hinta- ja volyymireaktion puolesta, kun osakevaihtosulautumiset 
julkistetaan perjantaina ja päivinä jolloin osavuosittaisten tulosjulkistuksien määrä on korkea. 
Esittämäni tulokset eivät kuitenkaan ole kovin vahvat ja yhdenmukaiset koko näytteen ja kohteiden 
eri kategorioiden osalta oikeuttaakseen vahvaan tukeen esitettyjen sijoittajien 
tarkkaamattomuuden ja rajallisen tarkkaavaisuuden vaikutuksista osakevaihtosulautumisien 
julkistusten yhteydessä. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior literature implies that limited investor attention may explain observed market 
underreactions to various types of corporate announcements. Some of these announcements 
include Friday stock-for-stock merger announcements, and earnings surprises on high-
distraction days. According to the investor inattention hypothesis, lowered investor attention, 
due to various different circumstances, essentially manifests itself as market underreaction to 
relevant information. I.e. there is a muted market response. In these models, investor attention 
is presumed to be a limited cognitive resource. As Louis and Sun (2010) point out, it is 
important to note, that investor inattention does not presume that investors pay no attention at 
all. As the term limited investor attention implies, it assumes that investors pay less attention 
than is optimal – or standard models assume – in decision making. 
Two earlier research papers are of specific interest for my study. First, the one presented by 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), who study how the amount of same day quarterly earnings 
announcements affect the market response to firms’ earnings surprises. Their research covers 
the time period of 1995-2004. The authors’ proposed investor distraction hypothesis, assumes 
that extraneous news inhibits investor attention to relevant news. The proxy for investor 
distraction is the number of same-day quarterly earnings announcements. Days that are in the 
top and bottom deciles in the daily number of quarterly earnings announcements, are 
categorized as “high-news days” and “low-news days” respectively. Investors are presumed to 
get distracted, when a larger amount of quarterly earnings announcements occur on the same 
day, i.e. “high-news days”, high-distraction days. 
Second, Louis and Sun (2010), study the price and volume reaction for acquirers that announce 
stock swap mergers on Fridays, with data spanning from January 1994 to December 2006. 
According to the presented investor inattention hypothesis, reduced investor attention on 
Fridays, can lead to a muted market response to announcements of stock swap mergers. 
In my study, I combine some aspects of both aforementioned research papers. In specific, I use 
the daily number of quarterly earnings announcements as a proxy for investor distraction, as in 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Days that are in the top and bottom deciles in daily number 
of quarterly earnings announcements, are categorized as “high-news days” and “low-news 
days”. 
2 
 
While Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) study how a greater number of quarterly earnings 
announcements, occurring on the same day as firms’ earnings surprise announcements, affects 
the market reactions to these earnings surprises, I alter the setting of the study from earnings 
surprises to cover stock swap merger announcements, as in Louis and Sun (2010). Thus 
essentially, I research if a larger number of quarterly earnings announcements occurring on the 
same day as stock swap merger announcements, affect acquirers’ price and volume reactions. I 
compute acquirers’ daily abnormal returns and trading volumes on days -1, 0, +1 and 
cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 around the 
announcement. All acquirers in my sample are publicly traded companies. Thus, when I refer 
to acquirers’ abnormal returns or trading volumes in the context of my study, the acquirers’ 
public status is implied – which may be obvious, but also worth to mention. 
Additionally, I replicate the study of Louis and Sun (2010) for comparative purposes. In both 
studies, I calculate acquirers’ abnormal returns and trading volumes separately, for acquirers 
that announce stock swap mergers of privately and publicly owned targets. I.e. the sample is 
divided according to the private/public status of the target.  
This aforementioned approach is equivalent to the one used in Louis and Sun (2010), and relates 
to prior research reporting that returns for acquirers using stock as a medium of payment, are 
on average, positive (negative), when the target’s status is private (public) ((Chang (1998); 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005); Louis (2005); 
Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)). I.e. the market reaction to stock swap announcements, is on 
average, positive (negative), when the target’s status is private (public). Hence, the division of 
the sample based on whether privately or publicly owned targets are involved is of interest, 
since the expected market response varies between these two groups. In addition, the results 
provide better insight of the proposed effects of investor distraction and inattention across 
different categories of stock swap mergers. 
Overall, merger announcements can be viewed as highly important news to investors. In most 
cases, it can be expected that investors truly pay an optimal amount of attention to these 
announcements. Thus, of central interest in my study is, whether investor distraction - proxied 
by the amount of same day quarterly earnings announcements - is at play and has a significant 
muted effect on acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes and returns, even in the context of one of 
the largest corporate events. 
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1.1 Scope of the study 
This thesis includes announcements of stock swap mergers between U.S. companies, from 
January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2014. All acquirers in my sample are publicly traded 
companies. As stated earlier, when I speak of the acquirers’ abnormal returns or trading 
volumes in the context of my study, the status of the acquirer is public. The full sample is 
divided in two, according to the private/public status of the target, to test for the high-news day 
and Friday differential effects in abnormal returns and trading volumes. 
When I test for the high-news day merger announcement differential returns, the control groups 
consist of low-news days and non-high-news days. Days that are in the bottom decile in the 
number of quarterly earnings announcements are categorized as low-news days. I have chosen 
to include the non-high-news days (all observations not classified as high-news days) as an 
additional control group for further robustness, and to examine whether investor distraction – 
proxied by the daily number of quarterly earnings announcements occurring on the same day 
as merger announcements – increases linearly. I.e., if the differentials between the high-news 
days and low-news days are larger than the differentials between the high-news days and non-
high-news days. Also, if there is inconsistent variation in the differentials between the high-
news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, the proxy for measuring investor 
distraction might not apply very well to this context. 
In the case of the Friday effect, the control group consists of non-Friday, i.e. Monday through 
Thursday. In both tests of high-news day and Friday differential market reactions, the 
observations for the control groups are obtained from the same whole sample. This makes sense, 
since the aim is to test for the stock swap merger announcement differential effects in the same 
announcement context, and not between those of mergers and e.g. cash acquisitions. 
This is a short-term event study around the merger announcement window (-1,+1). I calculate 
differences in abnormal trading volumes and returns separately for all specific days (-1, 0 and 
+1), as well as cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes over the 2-day 
announcement window, days 0 and +1. I do not compute long-run abnormal returns or trading 
volumes. Hence, it is also important to note, that when I speak of the acquirers’ abnormal 
returns or trading volumes in the context of my study, it refers to short-term price and volume 
reactions. Nevertheless, in most cases, I further specify in the text to which specific day(s) I 
refer to. 
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1.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
My research questions are closely related to those presented in Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009) as well as Louis and Sun (2010). On a general level, do some specific circumstances 
lower investor attention – from the optimal level - to relevant news? Leading to possible 
investor inattention, distraction, and as a result underreaction to relevant corporate 
announcements. The ex-ante expected end result, is a muted price and volume response to a 
specific corporate announcement. In this case a merger announcement, where the medium of 
payment is stock. 
The primary research question stands: is there a muted market reaction in regard to acquirers’ 
average abnormal returns and trading volumes, when a stock swap merger is announced on a 
high-news day (top decile in daily number of quarterly earnings announcements)? The control 
groups are both low-news days (bottom decile in daily number of quarterly earnings 
announcements), and non-high-news days (all other days not classified as high-news days). 
The ex-ante expectation is that there is, on average, a muted price and volume reaction in regard 
to stock-for-stock mergers, when they are announced on high-news days, compared to low-
news days and all non-high-news days. When the target’s status is private, the expectation is 
that the acquirers’ abnormal returns on high-news days, are on average, less positive. 
Respectively, when the target’s status is public, the expectation is that the acquirers’ abnormal 
returns on high-news days, are on average, less negative. For both privately and publicly owned 
targets, the expectation is that the acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes on high-news days, are 
on average, less positive. The hypotheses in regard to the investor distraction effect on high-
news days are presented below. 
Differences in abnormal returns: 
H1: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when the target’s 
status is private. 
H2: There is a statistically significant positive differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when the target’s 
status is public. 
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Differences in abnormal trading volumes: 
H3: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when 
the target’s status is private. 
H4: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when 
the target’s status is public. 
My secondary research question is: is there, on average, a muted market reaction in regard to 
acquirers’ abnormal returns and trading volumes, when a stock swap merger is announced on a 
Friday? Here, the control group is non-Friday. According to the investor inattention hypothesis 
presented by Louis and Sun (2010), the expectation is that there is, on average, a muted price 
and volume reaction in regard to stock-for-stock mergers, when they are announced on Friday, 
compared to other weekdays. 
When the target’s status is private, the expectation is that the acquirers’ abnormal returns on 
Fridays, are on average, less positive. Respectively, when the target’s status is public, the 
expectation is that the acquirers’ abnormal returns on Fridays, are on average, less negative. 
For both privately and publicly owned targets, the expectation is that the acquirers’ abnormal 
trading volumes on high-news days, are on average, less positive. The hypotheses in regard to 
the investor inattention effect on Fridays are presented below. 
Differences in abnormal returns: 
H5: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is private. 
H6: There is a statistically significant positive differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is public. 
Differences in abnormal trading volumes: 
H7: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is private. 
H8: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on Fridays and non-Fridays when the target’s status is public. 
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1.3 Overview of the key results 
On the whole, I gain some support for the proposed investor distraction hypotheses in regard 
to the differential abnormal returns and trading volumes between high-news days and low-news 
days/non-high-news days. However, the results are not very robust and consistent across the 
whole sample. 
H1: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when the target’s 
status is private. 
H2: There is a statistically significant positive differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when the target’s 
status is public. 
Specifically, for differences in average abnormal returns, I gain support for Hypothesis 1 (at 
the 5 % and 10 % significance levels), but not for Hypothesis 2. The multivariate regression 
provides similar results, after controlling for the acquirer’s size (market capitalization), book-
to-market ratio and the relative size of the transaction (total transaction value/acquirer’s market 
capitalization). However, for Hypothesis 1, most of the effect seems to be attributable to day 
+1, the following trading day after the merger announcement. The negative differential between 
high-news days and low-news days on day +1, is the only statistically significant (at the 5 % 
level) value on the daily level (see Table 6 for further clarification). 
H3: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when 
the target’s status is private. 
H4: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news days, when 
the target’s status is public. 
For the differences in average abnormal trading volumes, I gain support for Hypothesis 4, but 
not for Hypothesis 3. In fact, in regard to Hypothesis 3, the difference in average abnormal 
trading volumes between the high-news days and non-high-news days is positive, and 
statistically significant at the 10 % level on day 0. I.e. the effect is opposite to the hypothesized 
effect.  
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In respect to Hypothesis 4, my results show statistically significant (at the 5 % and 1 % level) 
values, for the differences in average cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1. 
However, it is of concern that the negative differential is larger, when comparing the high-news 
days and non-high-news days, instead of the high-news days and low-news days. This does not 
lend strong support for the investor distraction effect, since investor attention should be higher 
– or closer to the optimal level – on low-news days. The multivariate results with control 
variables, provide similar results as those obtained in the univariate tests for the differentials in 
abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1. 
To summarize, for Hypotheses 1 through 4, the statistically significant results I obtain in my 
univariate tests for the differences in cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading 
volumes over days 0 and +1, are confirmed in the multivariate tests, with the control variables 
included. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are rejected. Hypotheses 1 and 4 receive partial support. Overall, 
the results are not consistent and robust enough, to support the hypothesized muted market 
reaction to stock swap merger announcements that are made on high-news days. 
I am able to partially verify the results of Louis and Sun (2010) in regard to the investor 
inattention hypothesis for stock swap mergers announced on Fridays. However, my results are 
not as robust as theirs. I.e. the magnitudes of the Friday and non-Friday differentials are not as 
large, statistically significant. 
H5: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is private. 
H6: There is a statistically significant positive differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal returns on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is public. 
To some degree, I gain support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. The differences in the acquirers’ 
average cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1 are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 % level, for Hypothesis 5. Respectively, for Hypothesis 6, the difference is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 % level. I show similar results for both in my 
multivariate tests, with the control variables included. 
However, in respect to Hypothesis 5, most of the negative differential is attributable to day +1 
after the merger announcement (statistically significant at the 1 % level). The differential on 
day 0 is negative, and statistically significant at the 10 % level. This suggests that most of the 
muted market response occurs the following trading day, presumably Monday. For hypothesis 
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6, the Friday – non-Friday differential value is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % 
level, on day 0. On day +1, the differential is negative, but not statistically significant. Thus, 
there might be some reversal in the muted day 0 Friday abnormal trading volumes on day +1, 
but as mentioned the differential is not significant. 
H7: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on Fridays and non-Fridays, when target’s status is private. 
H8: There is a statistically significant negative differential between the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes on Fridays and non-Fridays, when the target’s status is public. 
In regard to the differences in abnormal trading volumes, my univariate test results provide a 
positive differential for Hypothesis 7, and a negative differential for Hypothesis 8. Neither of 
the values are statistically significant when calculating abnormal trading volumes over days 0 
and +1. However, after controlling for size, relative size and book-to-market in the multivariate 
tests, I receive a statistically significant (at the 10 % level) value for Hypothesis 8. Also here, 
it is of concern that most of the muted trading volume response over days 0 and +1, seems to 
be attributable to day +1 (statistically significant at the 10 % level). The differential is negative 
on day 0, but not statistically significant. Thus, the results suggest that most of the muted market 
reaction in regard to Hypothesis 8 occurs during the following day of the announcement, 
presumably Monday. 
Based on the Friday – non-Friday differential cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal 
trading volumes I gain support for Hypotheses 5, 6 and 8. Hypothesis 7 is rejected. However, 
the results are not very robust, and the daily characteristics during day 0 and +1, do not on the 
whole, lend consistent support for the proposed investor inattention hypothesis on Fridays. 
 
1.4 Contribution to the existing literature 
The mixed results I receive, for the hypothesized investor distraction effect on high-news days, 
suggest that the daily number of earnings announcements is perhaps not a very good proxy for 
investor distraction, in the context of stock swap merger announcements. Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009) use the proxy in the context of earnings surprises, and show statistically significant 
and robust results.  
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However, earnings announcements and surprises differ from merger announcements, in that 
they are to a higher degree anticipated news. Thus, our results are not directly comparable. 
Perhaps merger announcements are themselves such attention grabbing news that a large 
amount of earnings announcements occurring on the same days, do not warrant consistent 
results of a muted market reaction across transactions including private and public targets. 
My results also provide some indication to the opposite effect of limited investor attention. In 
some cases, the differentials are lower between the high-news days and low-news days, 
compared to the high-news days and non-high-news days. Thus, limited investor attention 
might not increase linearly, at least with a higher daily number of earnings announcements. 
At the least, to gain further insight to the investor distraction effect in the context of merger 
announcements and high-news days, other control variables should be included. E.g. multiple 
earnings surprises occurring on the same day, can be expected to have a larger distraction effect, 
than that of “normal” earnings announcements. Also, when several mergers and acquisitions 
are announced on the same day, it can be expected to increase investor distraction. Especially, 
if there are large “attention grabbing” announcements that receive the lion’s share of that day’s 
media coverage. The high-news/low-news status of the day following the merger 
announcement would also be of interest, since it could help explain some of the patterns I 
observe in regard to differentials in abnormal returns and trading volumes. I have not controlled 
for these above mentioned variables. Thus, I cannot elaborate on their possible effects. To 
contribute to the existing literature, to a higher degree, long-run abnormal returns and trading 
volumes should also be calculated, along with the short-run event window calculations. This 
would provide a wider perspective to the hypothesized effects. 
According to the results of Louis and Sun (2010) the muted Friday effect seems larger for 
smaller acquirers. My results are somewhat consistent to theirs in regard to acquirers’ 
differential cumulative abnormal returns when the target’s status is private/public, and 
abnormal trading volumes when the target’s status is public. However, as DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) report, if the muted price response on Fridays is attributable to investor distraction, 
trading volumes should also be affected. Thus, the inconsistency of my results does not lend 
strong support for the investor inattention hypothesis, of a muted market response to the 
corporate announcements made on Fridays (however, see next Section 1.5 for limitations of the 
study). 
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The results I report for the Friday investor inattention hypothesis, raises some questions about 
the robustness of the results reported by Louis and Sun (2010). A new forthcoming paper by 
Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, forthcoming) suggests that prior reported findings of 
the muted market reaction on Fridays, to various corporate announcements, including merger 
announcements, are due to selection bias. The authors find that firms conducting Friday 
announcements have experienced muted announcement effects on other weekdays also. These 
firms seem to share common unobserved characteristics. After controlling for the shared 
characteristics, the authors find no support for the investor inattention effect on Fridays. If the 
results of Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, forthcoming) hold, this could explain some 
of the differences between my results and those of Louis and Sun (2010).  
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
The main limitation of this thesis is that my sample only includes firms, acquirers with CRSP 
(The Center for Research in Security Prices) share codes 10.1 The first digit “1” refers to 
ordinary common shares. The second digit “0” stands for “securities which have not been 
further defined”. Observations with CRSP share codes 11 are omitted, which reduces my 
sample size. These are ordinary common shares, “securities which need not be further defined” 
(see the footnote for the exact CRSP descriptions). Thus, for my hypothesized investor 
distraction effect on high-news days, a possible limitation is that my sample size is not large 
enough. Also, as earlier mentioned, including additional control variables should be considered 
to gain further insight on the hypothesized effects. 
The omission of CRSP share codes 11 is also the likely reason to why I am not able to fully 
replicate the results of Louis and Sun (2010). I.e., verify their results for the Friday investor 
inattention phenomenon causing a muted market reaction, statistically significant in both 
abnormal trading volumes and returns, and for stock swap acquisitions of public and private 
targets. The sample of Louis and Sun (2010) includes 3 995 stock swap announcements, while 
my sample contains 2 833 observations, with an 8 year longer time period. It has to be noted 
though, that for the most part, I report effects that are in the same direction as their results, but 
                                                          
1 http://www.crsp.com/files/data_descriptions_guide_0.pdf (See page 79). 
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the magnitude differs. In short, I do not receive as robust results as Louis and Sun (2010), for 
the proposed muted market response on Fridays. 
Including CRSP share codes 11 would likely warrant more robust results in regard to the Friday 
muted market reaction effect, since my sample would to a larger degree include the same 
observations that Louis and Sun’s (2010) sample contains. This is due to the earlier years in my 
sample being heavily favored in the number of merger announcements (see Appendix 1). Louis 
and Sun (2010) data covers the time period of 1994-2006. In my sample, the number of merger 
announcements during the 2007-2014 time period amount to 337 in total, compared to 2 496 
during the time period 1994-2006 (see Appendixes 2 and 3). The yearly distribution – 2007 to 
2014 - of merger announcements with CRSP share code 11 acquirers included, would have to 
differ substantially from the one I show for CRSP share codes 10 to warrant opposite 
expectations to the results that Louis and Sun (2010) report. However, it is not likely that the 
overall decreasing trend of stock swap merger announcements after the 1998-2002 time period 
would significantly be altered, when including observations with CRSP share codes 11. 
The differences in our results also raise some interesting questions. First, are the excluded 
observations in my sample driving the results that Louis and Sun (2010) report? Second, are 
their results robust enough and do they hold for a subsample of theirs? Third, are some 
unobserved variables driving the differences in our results? My sample for Friday stock swap 
merger announcements is essentially a subsample of theirs. Thus, the ex-ante expectation is that 
I receive similar results. Another possibility is that the Friday muted market reaction effect in 
regard to stock swap merger announcements, is not present after the 2006 time period. As earlier 
mentioned, the results reported by Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, forthcoming), can 
also mean that selection bias is driving my results, when the Friday differential market reaction 
is considered. 
 
1.6 Structure of the paper 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present the findings of prior literature related to 
my topic of study. Section 3 covers the selection of the data and stock swap merger 
announcement sample. Section 4 demonstrates the methods used to calculate the abnormal 
returns and trading volumes. In Section 5, I present the empirical findings of my study, along 
with descriptive statistics of the sample. Section 6 provides further discussion of results and the 
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implications of my empirical findings. Section 7 offers a summary and suggestions for further 
research. 
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2. Prior literature 
This section covers relevant topics of prior literature, connected to my thesis topic of limited 
investor attention. First, I provide some general notions about behavioral finance and investor 
attention, after which I present a more in-depth analysis of related prior literature. 
 
2.1 Behavioral finance and investor attention 
The topic of limited investor attention falls under the broader category of behavioral finance, 
which seeks to combine a wider array of social science perspectives – including psychology 
and sociology – with conventional economics to provide explanations for why people make 
irrational financial decisions. Departures from rationality and classical assumptions emerge 
both in beliefs, judgments and choices, preferences. DellaVigna (2007) defines it, as deviations 
in nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs, and nonstandard decision making. These 
departures are of interest, because they help explain why and how markets might be inefficient.  
Behavioral aspects have been taken into consideration for quite a while in economics and 
finance research, e.g. Bernoulli (1738). But as a true approach and established field, it slowly 
started gaining momentum since the 1970s, or as Thaler (2015) titles it, “Beginnings”. Since 
the early 1990s the field has become a more prominent force in finance and economics. A 
current example of this is The Behavioral Insights Team (BIT), a UK government institution, 
which aims to redesign and improve public services through the application of behavioral 
sciences.2 
Herbert Simon coined the term “bounded rationality” in the 1950s and was among the earliest 
critics of the idea that people have unlimited information processing capabilities. The concept 
of bounded rationality, which maintains that decision makers’ rationality deviates from 
classical assumptions in having to work under three constraints: limited information, cognitive 
limitations in evaluating and processing available information, and limited amount of time. 
Rather than maximizing their benefit from a particular course of action, decision makers are 
bound to make “satisficing” or “good enough” choices in complex situations. Although Simon’s 
                                                          
2 http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ 
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work has been criticized for not providing enough specifics, it laid out some important 
groundwork for future studies in behavioral economics and finance. It links directly to my 
study, as individuals’ limited cognitive resources can cause limited investor attention to relevant 
information and further lead to market inefficiencies. 
Some of the most important facilitators of behavioral economics include psychologists Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky – famous for their work on the psychology of decision making 
and judgment. A pinnacle of their contributions to behavioral finance is the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Contrary to the standard expected utility theory, prospect 
theory focuses on changes in wealth rather than levels of wealth. Utility is modeled in terms of 
gains and losses from a reference level. According to the model the value function is steeper 
for losses than for gains and losses hurt approximately twice as much as similar gains satisfy. 
Also, the framing of choices has an effect on individuals’ preferences. The framing of 
information and choices applies to investor attention as well. 
For example, Hossain and Morgan (2006) document that variations in minimum bids, shipping 
and handling costs of same item eBay auctions, lead to significant differences in final selling 
prices. Items with lower minimum bids, but higher shipping and handling costs, have yielded 
significantly higher selling prices – although the initial total minimum cost is the same. In 
strongly efficient markets, investors should only care about the final total price. Investors seem 
to treat different components of price with separate mental accounts and show signs of loss-
aversion in bidding behavior.3 For example, when (the shipping and handling cost) reference 
level is not excessive and is set at $3.99, a minimum bid of $0.01 is not as large a deviation 
from the reference level, as would be the case vice versa. Odean, and Zheng (2005) report 
similar findings for mutual fund load fees. Investors seem to be more sensitive to salient “in-
your-face” front-end load fees and commissions, compared to operating expenses that 
incorporate these fees.  
Development of models such as the prospect theory have been important, since they provide 
better frameworks for understanding behavioral anomalies and market inefficiencies. Over the 
years, there have been numerous reported and observed market anomalies and inefficiencies 
that standard economic models have not been able to explain. One example of the clearest 
violations to standard economic theory is the case of Palm and 3Com, documented in (Lamont 
and Thaler 2001). 
                                                          
3 For mental accounting see Thaler (1985); Thaler (2015). 
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In the end though, behavioral economics does not aim to eradicate conventional economics, but 
rather build on it and provide improved models to account for the observed evidence based 
economics of humans. After all, the efficient markets based statistical models are primarily used 
to measure for variations in average cross-sectional returns. For example, the Fama-French 
Three Factor Model (Fama and French (1992, 1993)) explains a substantial part of variations 
in diversified portfolio returns. Behavioral economics and finance have also not been able to 
produce a unified theory that is directly rejectable (see e.g. Fama (1998)). 
However, Thaler (2015) puts it quite well, that the once supposedly irrelevant factors (SIFs), 
such as cognitive biases, heuristics in judgment and decision making, and other behavioral 
factors of humans have begun to matter a great deal. Limited investor attention is among these. 
There are numerous reasons that might cause reduced investor attention to e.g. corporate 
announcements and new information. One example is simply distraction, as investors are daily 
faced with a myriad amount of information from various different sources.  
Most investors likely try to direct their focus towards the most relevant information to aid in 
decision making.4 However, they often still need to assess and go through some irrelevant, 
unnecessary information, to filter out the relevant information. Experience may be of help, but 
it does not provide an all-encompassing solution. Information processing requires effort and 
attention, both of which are finite resources.  Thus, as long as we remain humans, systematic 
biases such as limited investor attention can be expected to persist. If and how they affect 
market efficiency is a logical step that follows.  
In finance and economic research papers, the terms investor inattention hypothesis and investor 
distraction hypothesis are used to describe similar phenomena. Investor inattention and limited 
investor attention likewise. As Louis and Sun (2010) point out, investor inattention does not 
presume that investors pay no attention at all. Rather, it assumes that investors pay less attention 
than is optimal – or standard models assume – in decision making. This may happen, due to 
e.g. facing a high load of information, or various other factors. From an efficient market 
perspective, this can lead to an irrational delayed reaction, underrection by investors to various 
external relevant stimuli. 
Investor attention also plays a dual role (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009)). On the one hand, 
limited investor attention can cause market underreactions. On the other hand, market 
overreactions require a sufficient level of investor attention to occur. Based on existing theories, 
                                                          
4 Although, attention grabbing distractive news headlines can be quite persuasive. 
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market overreactions are typically attributable to investors’ information processing biases, such 
as extrapolative expectations and overconfidence (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009)). These are 
documented in De Long et al. (1990), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
Limited investor attention is most likely very hard to directly measure. Thus, various proxies 
need to be used to measure for its proposed effects. The proxies do not provide a 100 percent 
correlation with the root cause. However, they provide a good start, if they are carefully 
selected. Hence, an important part in assessing the literature on limited investor attention, is 
considering the validity of the selected proxies. In other words, how well they explain a certain 
effect. 
For example, let us consider the Friday effect in Louis and Sun (2010). One could e.g. 
hypothesize that employees are less productive during certain weekdays. A proxy for 
inattention would be to devise a questionnaire, asking employees how much they think about 
the weekend and non-work related issues during different weekdays and working hours. As this 
is a highly subjective, qualitative measure, it would be hard to standardize and correctly 
measure. Just as it would be, when asking people how discomforting a visit to the dentist’s 
office was. This could then be measured against some selected metric of individual employee 
performance. As there are numerous different ways to measure employee performance, the 
selection of criteria also becomes important. 
As a branch of science, finance is in a good position, since there is ample standardized data 
available. For example, trading volumes and daily stock returns. The effects of various 
systematic biases can quite accurately be measured on a large scale. Although, this quite often 
works in reverse. A market anomaly, inefficiency is discovered, to which researchers 
subsequently try to provide an explanation(s).  
Several prior studies have documented irrational underreaction, delayed reaction by investors 
connected to various types of corporate decisions and events.5 As Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009, p. 2289) note, “there is on average a delayed price reaction to news that has the same 
sign as the immediate response”. During recent years, and in several of the most important prior 
research papers related to my study, limited investor attention has been proposed as an 
explanation for the observed market anomalies. Behavioral finance has indeed greatly benefited 
                                                          
5 Bernard and Thomas (1989); Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995); Desai and Jain (1997), Dichev and Piotroski (2001); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). 
For a more comprehensive listing, see Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). 
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from the work of other social scientists - including psychologists and sociologists – in trying to 
provide explanations for observed market anomalies. Ample financial data has also provided a 
setting to test for the proposed and often highly experimental hypotheses on a mass scale. Thus, 
behavioral finance works very much in tandem with other social sciences. 
Various different proxies have been used to measure investor inattention. These include 
amongst others, low trading volume, down market periods, event-occurrence during non-
trading hours, Fridays and daily number of earnings announcements (Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009)). I will now go through some of the most relevant research that have been carried 
out related to my study. The first part comprises studies related to the observed phenomena of 
delayed market reactions, market underreactions, and efficient markets. The second part 
consists of more recent literature that proposes limited investor attention, as a possible 
explanation for the observed anomalies related to underreaction. 
 
2.2 Equity issues and repurchases 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that firms conducting an IPO or an SEO, have underperformed 
in the long-run, 5-year period, compared to non-issuing companies of the same sizes. Their 
study covers the time period of 1970 to 1990. The authors adjust for both size and book-to-
market ratios, which do not significantly explain the results. Nor does long-term return reversals 
or differences in betas explain the underperformance of firms conducting SEOs. According to 
the authors, a possible explanation for the effects, is that firms take advantage of conditions by 
issuing equity when it is overvalued. Previous studies have documented, that the post-issue 
operating performance of issuing firms, did not justify the valuations at the time of the IPOs 
(e.g., Jain and Kini (1994); Mikkelson and Shah (1994)). 
However, the part that is most relevant for my study, is connected more closely to the delay in 
underperformance of issuing firms. In the presented results, the underperformance of issuing 
firms starts subsequent to the 6-month period after the IPO or SEO (Loughran and Ritter 
(1995)). Investors seem to overweight issuing firms’ recent performance and underweight long-
term mean-reverting tendencies. There is a delayed market reaction, and it seems to take a while 
for investors to respond, to issuing firms’ misvaluations at the time of the equity issue, given 
the levels of subsequent operating performance, cash flows. 
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) study the long-run stock performance of firms 
announcing share repurchases, during the time period 1980-1990. Their study is motivated by 
managers often stating that they are repurchasing shares due to undervaluation of the stock or 
it being a “good investment” – which indirectly states the same, if managers value positive 
returns as positive. This seems intuitive. After all, firms tend to announce equity issues, when 
they perceive it as being overvalued (Loughran and Ritter (1995)). The authors use a four year 
buy-and-hold strategy to measure potential abnormal performance. 
According to the Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), the average market reaction 
to open market share repurchase announcements is 3.5 %. Using the four year buy-and-hold 
strategy they report average positive abnormal returns of 12.1 % for the announcers. Combining 
announcement and long-run returns provides an undervaluation of approx. 15 %. In other 
words, there is post-announcement drift. Size and book-to-market effects are controlled for. In 
the case of value stocks (top book-to-market quantile), the average long-term abnormal return 
is 45.3 %. As per the authors, these high book-to-market companies announcing share 
repurchases seem to be truly “out-of-favor”, and exhibit higher performance compared to high 
book-to-market stocks in general. The reasoning here is that these high book-to-market firms, 
are more likely to be driven by undervaluation to conduct stock buybacks. 
This relates to the study of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), who evaluate that value 
strategies have outperformed the market, due to irrational behavior of investors, rather than 
value strategies being fundamentally riskier. I.e. their long-term higher performance is not 
attributable to compensation for being fundamentally riskier. Value stocks are “out-of-favor”, 
as investors flock to glamour stocks with recent high growth rates, e.g. earnings, cash flow. 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). As per the authors, growth rates are mean-reverting, 
and investors have consistently during the 1968-1990 period seemed to overestimate future 
growth rates of glamour firms’ financials. They have also overreacted to stocks performing very 
badly, causing these stocks to get underpriced. Contrarian investors then bet against these 
“naïve investors”, buying the underpriced shares. Hence, not all high book-to-market stocks are 
truly “out-of-favor”. 
In light of their results, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) raise questions over the 
appropriateness of evaluation the economic impact of corporate decisions, by measuring short-
term abnormal performance. This relates more closely to evaluating the whole market 
efficiency hypothesis, and I will go through it more thoroughly later on, when assessing the 
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paper presented by Fama (1998). In my study, I am not measuring post-event long-run abnormal 
returns, but rather focus on short-term abnormal returns around the event date (-1, +1). 
However, the observed long-term market underreaction phenomenon is of interest, since it 
implies that investors fail to fully adjust for new information even after the short-term event 
window. 
 
2.3 Post-earnings announcements drift (earnings momentum) 
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to document the post-earnings announcement drift 
phenomenon, i.e. that there is a delayed price reaction to earnings news. This applies for both 
positive and negative earnings news, and more specifically to unexpected earnings surprises. 
Their sample covers the time period of 1946 to 1966. The term earnings momentum, is used to 
describe the same phenomenon. The results of Ball and Brown have subsequently been 
confirmed in several other studies, see e.g. Watts (1978); Latane and Jones (1979); Bidwell and 
Riddle (1981); Rendleman, Jones, and Latane (1982); Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984)). Based 
on the post-earnings announcement drift, a long (short) position in the highest (lowest) decile 
in stocks of companies announcing earnings surprises, has also been documented to yield 
substantial abnormal returns (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009)). 
According to Reinganum (1981), the observed post-earnings announcement abnormal returns 
following earnings news, can be explained by shortcomings – omission of risk factors - in the 
one-period capital asset pricing model (CAPM), rather than market inefficiency. The omitted 
variables seem to be more closely related to firm size.  
Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) study the same phenomenon with data spanning from 1974 
to 1981, and find evidence of post-earnings announcement drift for a subset of earnings 
expectation models. According to the authors, some 80 percent of the differential abnormal 
returns during days +1 to +61 after the announcement, between high and low earning surprise 
portfolios, is explained by the sign and magnitude of the earnings surprises. In the authors’ 
words, “the more positive (negative) the unexpected earnings change, the more positive 
(negative) the post-announcement abnormal returns” (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984, p. 
598)). Firm size is reported to explain a substantial portion, 65 %, of the difference in abnormal 
returns between the highest and lowest decile of earnings surprise portfolios. 
20 
 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) build on the earlier work, with data from 1974 to 1986, trying to 
discriminate whether post-earnings announcement abnormal returns are explained, by a delayed 
price response to new information/earnings reports, or a failure to adjust returns fully for risk 
(CAPM misspecification). The authors present two possibilities for the delayed price reaction, 
transaction costs and investors who fail to fully incorporate the effects of the new information 
to their future estimates. They find little support for the explanation of incomplete risk 
adjustment. This is consistent with the later finding of Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996). 
However, their findings are consistent with the explanation of a delayed price reaction to new 
information. In Bernard and Thomas (1990), the same authors’ findings support the notion that 
investors fail to adjust current earnings information for future earnings expectations. I.e. 
investors fail to fully account for new information. 
Some alternative explanations have been proposed, although the delayed price reaction theory 
has continued to gain support. See, e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok (1996)). In more recent studies, limited investor attention has also been proposed 
as an explanation (for example, (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009)). 
 
2.4 Price momentum 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) study strategies of buying (selling) companies that have 
performed well (poorly) in the past, over the time period 1965-1989. Essentially, they are 
studying the price momentum effect. They find that a portfolio buying past winners and selling 
past losers creates significant abnormal returns over 3-12 month holding periods. These 
abnormal returns do seem to partly reverse in the long-run however, as half of the excess returns 
dissipate in the two years following the initial 3-12 month period after portfolio formation.  
The results suggest that information diffuses gradually, and investors are slow to adjust their 
valuations in the short-term, although the authors think attributing it as evidence of 
underreaction is likely too simplistic. Nonetheless, they mention that “the evidence is, however, 
consistent with delayed price reactions to firm-specific information” (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993 p. 67)). The authors present some theories that could help explain the results of short-
term positive performance and long-term return reversals. According to the Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), one explanation is that “positive feedback traders” temporarily shift prices away 
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from their fundamental values and cause the market to overreact in the short-term – which 
subsequently reverses in the long-term (documented in De Long, Shleifer, and Summers (1990). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) present an alternative hypothesis, whereby investors underreact 
to information about companies’ short-run expectations, but overreact to information about 
their long-run expectations. This provides an explanation to short-term price momentum, but 
not explicitly to long-term return reversals, as prices would need to continue to climb. 
According to the authors, the initial underreaction and subsequent overreaction can occur, due 
to the difference in nature of information that is available to investors to evaluate firms’ short-
term and long-term prospects. For example, earnings forecasts vs. more ambiguous information 
used in long-term valuation (presumably, such as the outlook for a specific sector or industry, 
and investor sentiment towards managers’ capabilities). For this to occur, investors partly need 
to assess long-term information irrationally, e.g. relying on gut feeling and subjective 
information. 
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) provide some additional input, on the observed 
abnormal returns, achieved through price and earnings momentum strategies, with data 
spanning from 1977 to 1993. Their results suggest that investors underreact to new information 
in both cases, leading to predictability of future returns from past returns. After controlling for 
market risk, size and book-to-market factors, their results are still robust. According to the 
authors, the results still hold whether standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), abnormal 
returns around earnings announcements, or revisions in analysts’ forecasts of earnings are used 
to measure earnings surprise. Also, price momentum seems to be larger and last longer than the 
effect of earnings momentum, and drifts seem to be the largest for the stocks that exhibit 
previous poor earnings performance (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)). Since there 
does not seem to be subsequent reversal in the drifts, the authors do not fully support the notion 
of positive feedback trading causing the effects. Rather, to a larger part delayed investor 
response to new information. 
Desai and Jain (1997) study the long-run (1-3 years) stock returns following announcements of 
stock splits and reverse splits, during the 1976-1991 period. For both stock splits and reverse 
splits, 1- and 3-year buy-and-hold strategies produce significant abnormal returns after the 
announcement month. These amount to 7.05 % and 11.87 % for stock splits, -10.76 % and -
33.90 % for reverse splits. The observed announcement month abnormal returns are 7.11 % for 
stock splits, and -4.59 % for reverse splits. According to the authors, the positive and negative 
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drifts suggest that the market underreacts to both split announcements, i.e. to firm-specific 
news. This is in line with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Additionally, both company size and 
book-to-market criteria seem to partly explain the observed abnormal returns. For stock splits, 
small firm 3-year abnormal returns are significantly higher compared to large firms, 46.87 % 
and 2.15 % respectively. Glamour stocks also seem to outperform value stocks, with 1-year 
abnormal returns of 8.73 % compared to 0.40 % (Desai and Jain (1997)). 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) report similar findings of market underreaction to Moody’s bond 
rating downgrades, during the time period of 1970-1997. In the first year after being 
downgraded, these companies’ stocks show negative abnormal returns of -10 to -14 %. 
Additionally, a substantial portion of the abnormal returns is attributable to subsequent earnings 
announcements after the downgrade. The effect is also stronger for low credit-quality, small 
firms. Bond rating upgrades do not show similar results. Lower systematic risk does not seem 
to explain the results, as downgrades underperform during most of the sample period. 
The notion that negative abnormal returns are more pronounced compared to positive abnormal 
returns, is consistent with Bernard and Thomas (1989), who find that the post-earnings 
announcement drift phenomenon is stronger for negative earnings surprises. Michaely, Thaler, 
and Womack (1995) report similar findings for dividend cuts and omissions compared to 
dividend increases and initiations. 
 
2.5 Market efficiency hypothesis 
Perhaps the most compelling arguments, for the market efficiency hypothesis come from Fama 
(1998). It is important to note, that this paper addresses the literature up to the year of 
publication, 1998. The author questions, whether various reported long-term return anomalies 
truly represent market inefficiencies, or just chance results consistent with the efficient markets 
theory.6 For example, under efficient markets - where available information is fully reflected in 
prices - overreactions are as common as underreactions. The same applies for post-event return 
continuation and post-event return reversal. The author goes through an array of finance 
literature, for which the scope of my study is not sufficient. However, the main arguments for 
                                                          
6 In Fama (1998), there is an informative table (Table 1 in the document) of the signs of long-run pre-event, 
announcement, and long-run post-event returns, reported in prior event studies. 
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the market efficiency theory rely on a set of core arguments that concern several of the studies 
and findings being presented here. 
First, according to Fama (1998), when the results of behavioral finance literature are viewed as 
a whole, reported underreaction and overreaction anomalies seem to be roughly evenly 
distributed. I.e. the hypothesized underreaction-driven anomalies are roughly as common as the 
hypothesized overreaction-driven anomalies. However, the author adds that if long-run 
abnormal returns are so large that they cannot be attributed to chance, this poses a problem for 
the efficient markets theory. 
Second, long-term abnormal return anomalies seem to be sensitive to methodology – contrary 
to short-term event studies, where daily expected returns are close to zero. According to Fama 
(1998), reasonable changes in methodology and/or statistical approaches, produces 
insignificant results. I.e. the anomalies are significantly reduced or disappear. Thus, as per the 
author, the results of different studies, can reasonably be attributed to chance, even when 
inspected one at a time. The author also questions the use of buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs), in favor of sums or averages of short-term abnormal returns (CARs, AARs). 
Reviewing the literature, Fama (1998) notes that different models’ difficulties in explaining 
abnormal returns of small stocks may be, due to bad-model problems. 
Third, the specific models used to predict patterns in one context, do not seem to explain very 
well the patterns observed in regard to other anomalies. For example, those that predict long-
run return reversals of pre-event abnormal returns, do not fare well in events that are 
characterized by long-run return continuation. I.e. the prediction of one specific model, is not 
the observed norm. The author mentions some examples, of which one is the model presented 
by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The model seems to fit to the reported results in 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), but not Desai and Jain (1997).7 
Fourth, the behavioral finance literature has not focused enough on creating an alternative 
hypothesis – that is rejectable - for market efficiency, but rather drawing conclusions that 
markets are in some aspects inefficient, due to the observed anomalies. (Fama (1998)). I.e., as 
mentioned earlier, a problem in regard to behavioral finance is the lack of a unified theory that 
explains a major part of the reported anomalies, market inefficiencies. 
                                                          
7 For a more comprehensive list, see Fama (1998). 
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In Fama (1998) there is an interesting notion related to this study. When using value-weighted 
returns, rather than equally weighted returns, post-event long-run abnormal returns often 
decrease or disappear. Bad-model problems seem to be more pronounced in the case of using 
equally weighted returns, although this is discussed in the context of long-run returns, which I 
do not measure. Concluding, the author notes that the post-earnings announcement drift 
phenomenon, documented in Ball and Brown (1968) and Bernard and Thomas (1990), as well 
as price momentum, documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), are among the reported 
anomalies that survive the robustness checks.  
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) confirm that conflicting results in long-term event studies of similar 
topics can be due to the results being sensitive to the models used for calculating expected 
returns. However, the authors also comment that short-term event studies do not seem to capture 
the full effects of the market reaction to corporate events. Some events have been mentioned 
above, for example IPOs and SEOs, proxy contests. 
There have been numerous counterarguments made to the arguments presented in Fama (1998), 
but listing them all is beyond the scope of this study. Also, the paper of Fama (1998) mainly 
presents arguments, as to why the market efficiency hypothesis survives the test of reported 
long-run anomalies. This is not at the center of my study, although they are of overall interest. 
One example is Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), who do not believe that the 
reported underreaction and overreaction driven anomalies are attributable to chance, but show 
strong and regular return patterns. According to the authors, the size, book-to-market and 
momentum effects persist across different time periods and internationally. Also, most of the 
reported anomalies exhibit a pattern, where average post-event stock returns are of the same 
sign as public event-date average stock returns (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998)). 
 
2.6 Earnings announcements and limited investor attention 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) find a muted immediate and higher delayed market reaction 
(post-earnings announcement drift) to a firm’s earnings surprise, when there is a greater amount 
of same day earnings announcements made by other firms. In short, extraneous news appear to 
cause market underreaction – presumably attributable to investor attention - to relevant news. 
The authors find statistically significant evidence for both abnormal returns and trading 
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volumes. The proxy of same-day earnings announcements seems applicable, as it directly 
measures the information load faced by investors. It is thus assumed, that investors possess 
limited cognitive resources. 
There is an important distinctive feature between this and some other research papers on limited 
investor attention.8 The authors express it quite well, “the prior empirical literature on investor 
attention has primarily focused on the neglect of public information signals, on the effects of 
conditions (market return, volume, time-of-day, day of week) that proxy for lower investor 
attention, and on how greater publicity draws attention to the firm” (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009, p. 2292). Rather than testing for what other calls on limited cognitive resources hinder 
the appropriate response to new information, their method tests directly whether distractive 
signals draw attention away from relevant signals. 
This is also a feature in my study, as I test whether a greater amount of same day earnings 
announcements draw attention away from merger announcements. I also test for the Friday 
effect, but as stated, this is connected to effects of conditions. In the case of e.g. Friday, investor 
attention can be lower, due to wrapping up business for the week and the upcoming weekend. 
Different weekends most likely differ in importance to various investors, but there is only one 
weekend – namely two days - between Friday and Monday. The level remains unaltered. The 
number of earnings announcements can widely differ between separate days. Hence, the two 
methods of testing for limited investor attention do indeed differ. 
Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009) test for the hypothesis of investor attention playing a dual role in 
explaining both earnings and price momentum. The authors findings suggest that earnings 
momentum (price momentum) weakens (strengthens) with investor attention. Limited investor 
attention is provided as an explanation for the price underreaction to earnings announcements.  
According to their hypotheses, low volume stocks are expected to be more prone to the earnings 
momentum effect, presumably due to investors paying less attention to these stocks. Contrary, 
high volume stocks are expected to be more prone to the price momentum effect, driven by 
overreaction. The authors find evidence for both. Also, earnings momentum profits are found 
to be higher in down markets, and price momentum profits higher in up markets (Hou, Peng, 
and Xiong (2009)). This is supported by Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009), who report 
                                                          
8 See e.g. Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992); Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005); DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); 
Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009); Louis and Sun (2010). For a more 
comprehensive list, see Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). 
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of an “ostrich effect”, whereby investors pay more attention to their portfolios in rising markets 
than when markets are flat or falling. In the long-run, there seems to be a reversal in price 
momentum returns, but not in earnings momentum returns (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009)). This 
applies for months 13-36 after portfolio formation. The latter finding somewhat contradicts that 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who report that achieved abnormal earnings momentum 
profits for the first year after portfolio formation of past winners and losers partly dissipate in 
the two following years. In short, they document a partial long-term reversal. Both authors 
observe similar results for the long-term reversal of price momentum profits.  
For my thesis the long-run reversal of earnings momentum profits – or lack of it – is not a 
central issue, since I concentrate on measuring abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
This is however an interesting aspect of the phenomenon. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009, p. 
2309) observe that “the difference in drift between high-distraction and low-distraction days 
declines over longer horizons, and becomes small and insignificant by 90 days after the earnings 
announcement”. They do not test for a possible long-run reversal. Their results rather indicate 
that the difference in drift becomes insignificant in the longer run, as investors become more 
informed. Limited investor attention, investor distraction is implicated as providing an 
explanation for market underreaction, when investors are faced with a high amount of irrelevant 
news. 
Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009) use trading volume as a proxy for attention in their cross-sectional 
analysis. This seems applicable, given their explanation that active trading is assumed to require 
investors’ attention, and referral to prior established research. See, e.g. Odean (1998); 
Sheinkman and Xiong (2003). In short, in order to trade a stock, investors need to pay attention 
to it. In the authors’ words, “when they pay less attention to a stock, they are less likely to trade 
it; and when they pay more attention to a stock, behavioral biases such as overconfidence can 
give rise to heterogeneous opinions among investors about the stock, thus generating more 
trading”. Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009, p. 2) 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) find some evidence – significant at the 5 % level - that the 
investor distraction effect on announcement date cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and 
+1, is lower for larger firms. In other words, the investor inattention phenomenon seems to be 
higher for small companies. Investor distraction also seems to be stronger for positive earnings 
surprises, compared to negative earnings surprises. 
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The above mentioned observations carry some implications for my research. I am not directly 
studying the effect of limited investor attention on earnings announcements surprises. However, 
a merger announcement can be viewed as a surprising event for investors - assuming that 
information about the merger is not to a significant degree leaked in advance. Thus, limited 
investor attention should be more pronounced in the case of smaller announcing companies. 
This is supported by the stronger earnings momentum effect for low volume stocks. Low 
volume stocks are typically those of smaller companies with less market liquidity. According 
to the “ostrich effect”, investor inattention should also increase in flat or falling markets. Lastly, 
positively surprising merger announcements can be hypothesized to exhibit stronger effects of 
limited investor attention. 
 
2.7 Events occurring when markets are closed and down market periods 
Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992) study the price and volume reactions to earnings 
announcements, made during non-trading hours. Specifically, they compare the market reaction 
between earnings news released during trading and non-trading hours, and by the same firms’ 
during consecutive years. The focus is on the price and volume reactions, when the stock 
exchange (NYSE) opens the following trading day, after an “overnight” announcement. The 
reasoning is that this is the first opportunity for investors to act on the information released 
during non-trading hours.  
The authors do not find support for a significant differential opening market reaction during the 
following trading day, based on the prior released non-trading hour information. This does not 
seem to occur, due to the following days’ opening price setting process, the nature of the news 
released during non-trading hours, or the requirement that specialists maintain orderly price 
sequences (Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992)). By issuing a buy or sell order before the 
NYSE opens, based on the sign of the forecast error (Value Line), the strategy yields abnormal 
returns of 1.4 % during the two days after the opening of the exchange. However, Francis, 
Pagach, and Stephan (1992) note that net of transaction costs, the approach seems to be 
unprofitable. 
With earnings announcement data spanning from 2000 to 2003, Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts 
(2005) weigh in on the discussion. According to the authors, the removal of information 
dissemination barriers in the 1990s, has changed the distribution of firms’ quarterly earnings 
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announcements across trading and non-trading hours. Over the time period of 2000-2003, most 
of the quarterly earnings announcements seem to be released outside of regular trading hours 
(approx. 73 % of the sample). The respective figure is some 23 %, documented in prior research 
(Patell and Wolfson (1982)). After trading hours, and Friday earnings announcements also tend 
to contain to a larger degree bad news, according to earlier studies (Penman (1987); Damodaran 
(1989)).  
Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005) find that outside of trading hours announcements do not 
seem to contain as much negative information as earlier studies report. However, it is verified 
that Friday earnings announcements tend to contain negative information. The authors do not 
solely attribute the release of bad news on Fridays as managers’ strategic timing, but also to a 
muted market reaction and investors partly anticipating earlier in the week the bad news on 
Fridays. Additionally, managers may try to time the information release during Friday, to 
manage the market reaction over the weekend. 
Shevlin and Thornock (2015) find evidence, for the notion that investors anticipate negative 
earnings announcements on Fridays. There is a negative market response, when firms inform 
investors of a forthcoming Friday earnings announcement. The authors use earnings 
announcement data from 2000 to 2011, inclusive. The central theme of the paper is to evaluate, 
whether managers try hide bad news, when investor attention is lower. 
The authors verify that firms tend to issue negative news on Fridays, busy days, outside trading 
hours, and with less advance forewarning. However, Shevlin and Thornock (2015) do not find 
support for reduced investor attention on Fridays. The authors propose that the tendency of 
firms releasing bad news on Fridays might be, due to managers incorrectly assuming it as a 
reduced investor attention day. In all other aforementioned settings, earnings news seems to be 
met with a muted market response. The results of Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009) are consistent 
with Shevlin and Thornock (2015), in that the effects of earnings momentum are larger in down 
markets and for low volume stocks. These conditions, circumstances proxy for lower investor 
attention. 
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2.8 Information incorporation 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) study how investor perceptions and market reactions are affected, 
depending on how firms choose to present financial information. In their model, investors are 
risk averse and limited investor attention is presumed. I.e. investor attention is presumed to be 
a limited cognitive resource. The authors find that even when the information content is 
equivalent, how information is presented – i.e. the form – does matter and affects investors’ 
information processing. Also, there is a difference in the market reaction, depending on if items 
are “recognized as part of earnings, or merely disclosed as a footnote” (Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003, p. 338)). Specifically, the authors focus on three types of information releases: pro forma 
earnings disclosures, employee option compensations and degrees of aggregation in reporting. 
Overall, the study provides some interesting implications and predictions to why the form of 
presenting financial information matters. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) present that when pro 
forma earnings announcements contain non-GAAP disclosures, investors are prone to provide 
a higher valuation to the announcing firms’ stock. However, according to the authors, stock 
prices may also reflect fundamental value more precisely, when non-GAAP disclosures are 
included in pro forma earnings announcements. Thus, it is not directly implied that the inclusion 
of non-GAAP disclosures causes overvaluation.  
The authors also note that investors may fail to fully distinguish between the information 
content of firms’ accruals and cash flows. This seems valid, since presumably there are 
investors involved in e.g. the stock market, who do not fully distinguish between the differences 
of a profit and loss statement and a cash flow statement. As per the authors, this may help 
explain post-earnings announcement drift. In particular, the relation between firms’ accruals 
and earnings momentum abnormal returns, which is documented in Sloan (1996). Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003) note that investors seem to overreact to accruals related news and underreact 
to cash flow related news, and that companies may take advantage of this investor tendency 
through manipulating earnings information. Some examples mentioned, where this is 
documented, include Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Xie (2001). 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) present somewhat twofold results in regard to the expensing of 
employee stock options, when they are granted. Not fully expensing stock options when 
granted, can according to the authors, lead to overvaluation of firms’ stock. However, fully 
expensing them can lead to undervaluation. Whether firms utilize financial reporting, at the 
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segment or aggregate level also seems to matter. The authors findings suggest that earnings 
should be reported at the aggregate level, when investors have limited attention. Investors are 
prone to put more emphasis on the segments with low growth at the expense of the segments 
with high growth, when estimating earnings at the aggregate level (Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003)). This is an interesting implication, as one would assume that financial reporting at the 
segment level, would provide improved information value and better insight to how the firm 
performs at the segment level.  
On the whole, the findings of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) are in line with e.g. Odean, and 
Zheng (2005), in that investors are more sensitive to salient, easily noticeable and 
understandable information. Another example of this is that investors do not seem to fully 
account for off balance sheet items in valuing firms (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)). 
Peng (2005) studies the learning process of an investor with a capacity constraint, namely 
limited attention. In the authors model, information is treated as endogenous, since 
incorporating information requires time and effort, both of which are limited resources. 
According to the author, the model presumes that the investor tries to minimize the total 
uncertainty of her portfolio of financial assets. This is achieved by optimally allocating attention 
to multiple sources of uncertainty, i.e. the different individual financial assets in the portfolio. 
The author’s model is quite detailed, but the main implication of the paper is that large firms’ 
stocks incorporate information at a faster pace compared to those of smaller firms. As per Peng 
(2005) this is due to investors allocating more attention to large stocks in their portfolio, since 
they contribute more to the total portfolio uncertainty. On an aggregate level large stocks 
receive more attention. Larger stocks also seem to adjust to fundamental shocks at a faster rate 
and are less vulnerable to external shocks (Peng (2005)). 
Peng and Xiong (2006) extend the analysis of Peng (2005), in studying how investor learning 
affects asset prices. Also in this model, investors possess limited attention and information is 
treated as endogenous. According to the authors, “limited attention leads to “category learning” 
behavior: an attention-constrained investor tends to allocate more attention to market- and 
sector-level factors than firm specific factors.” (Peng and Xiong (2006, p. 2). Also, if attention 
is truly scarce, investors might disregard firm-level information altogether in favor of 
aggregate-level data. This seems intuitive, as if an investor is under time and attention pressure, 
he/she does not necessarily have the resources to dig into all the detailed information. 
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The authors mention an interesting example, where this effect might have been at play. Namely, 
firms that renamed themselves, to include the dot.com ending during the dot-com boom. As per 
Peng and Xiong (2006), without changes in fundamentals, these companies’ stocks exhibited 
substantial abnormal performance during the name change announcements, compared to those 
that did not participate in such practices. This is documented in Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 
(2001). However, the reasoning in the aforementioned example is not exactly clear, since it is 
the market- and sector-level factor that is drawing attention away from the firm-specific level. 
It is true that investors might have paid so much attention to market wide and sector wide 
information that they disregard firm-specific information, but here it is not something else than 
market and/or sector wide information that has limited investor attention, which causes them to 
disregard firm-specific data. 
In a way this is an interesting analogy, since it could be extended to my study as well, if I 
measured the market response to e.g. earnings surprises, when there are multiple mergers and/or 
acquisitions announced at the same time. Mergers can be expected to be of higher importance 
to earnings surprises, but is firm-level data or market wide data more important in valuing 
companies? I would expect that individuals investing in companies would at least be somewhat 
familiar with the market, sector a company operates in before investing, thus making the market 
wide data the primary information channel. 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) tap in to the limited attention discussion, by studying how 
changes in demographic factors affect the stock performance in different industries – 48 in total. 
The time period under inspection is 1939-2003. The authors build a cohort growth rate forecast 
model based on past information, and report quite accurate estimations over a ten-year time 
period, compared to the real cohort growth rates. As per the authors, future cohort sizes of 
different age groups are estimated by inspecting current cohort sizes, mortality and fertility rates 
(DellaVigna and Pollet (2007)). Essentially, the authors build a forecast model that estimates 
the consumption of specific goods – industries – based on estimated sizes of different age 
groups. Since different age group spend money on specific services, e.g. toys, housing, it 
provides estimates of future consumption rates across industries. Of the authors’ specific 
interest is, when stock prices adjust to the estimated growth rates of demand in goods across 
different industries – e.g. profitability. 
As per DellaVigna and Pollet (2007), estimated long-term demand increases – 4 to 8 years - 
predict abnormal stock performance, while short-term demand increases do not. According to 
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the authors, limited attention is a possible explanation, whereby investors have short horizons 
and do not fully account for the estimated long-run demand increases across different goods, 
industries. The authors note that a trading strategy exploiting this pattern can yield substantial 
annual abnormal returns of approx. 6 %. 
 
2.9 Weekday variations and characteristics 
There are studies indicating that investors are less attentive to corporate announcements on 
Fridays – a proxy for investor inattention. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) report that compared 
to other weekdays Friday earnings announcements are met with a lower immediate and higher 
delayed market reaction, due to investor distraction. Their findings suggest that limited investor 
attention drives underreaction to new information and helps explain post-earnings 
announcement drift. Louis and Sun (2010) test for the inattention hypothesis in an even larger 
corporate event setting, namely merger announcements. Given the high importance of these 
events it could be assumed that they always attract sufficient investor attention, regardless of 
the weekday they are announced. However, Louis and Sun (2010) observe a muted market 
reaction for Friday stock swap announcements compared to other weekdays. 
The results of these studies are quite interesting, as they find significant results for both 
abnormal trading volumes and abnormal returns in regard to Friday announcements. They also 
provide some insightful implications, e.g. in regard to strategic timing. Managers who seek to 
maximize short-term value could strive to release worse earnings announcements on Fridays. 
In the case of merger announcements and reported results of Louis and Sun (2010) the 
conclusion is partly true.  
For public acquirers, stock-for-stock acquisitions involving publicly owned targets are on 
average met with a negative market reaction, while the effect is opposite for privately owned 
targets (Louis and Sun (2010)) – see e.g. Chang (1998); Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002); 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005); Louis (2005); Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). Thus, 
managers who maximize short-term value could seek to announce stock swap mergers 
involving publicly owned targets on Fridays, and avoid doing this in the case of privately owned 
targets. However, given that the authors find positive differential abnormal returns and lower 
abnormal trading volumes for Friday stock swap announcements involving publicly owned 
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targets, limited attention seems to be the likelier explanation rather than strategic timing (Louis 
and Sun (2010)). 
A point to consider, is that the distribution of earnings announcements show highly seasonal 
patterns and seem to cluster depending on the day of the week (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009)). Damodaran (1989) finds the highest number of earnings announcements occurring on 
Tuesdays followed by Wednesday, Thursday, Monday, and the lowest on Friday. DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009) show similar results with more recent data. This carries some implications 
for my research as well.  
Most of the Friday merger announcements in my sample are likely to occur during “non-high-
news days”. Since prior studies suggest that there is a muted market reaction to corporate 
announcements that are made on Fridays the interpretation of my results likely becomes more 
complicated. To a certain degree this also provides a natural setting for excluding the effect of 
Friday announcements from the analysis. However, bias towards “high-news days” including 
the Friday effect will likely be reduced. 
In regard to stock swap mergers, the number of announcements is highest on Mondays and 
clearly lowest on Fridays, as documented by Louis and Sun (2010). I also observe this in my 
sample. Of all observations, the merger announcements occurring on Fridays are 15.1 % and 
13.5 % for public targets and private targets respectively. These figures deviate considerably 
from the approx. 20 % that could be assumed under classical assumptions.  
An interesting notion, is that for private targets, I observe the highest number of mergers 
announced occurring on Tuesdays. This differs from the weekly distribution characteristics of 
Louis and Sun (2010). Otherwise, I find similar weekly distribution characteristics. As the 
authors note, a possible reason for high Monday percentages is that deals can be negotiated and 
approved over the weekend and announced at the beginning of the week. However, this 
reasoning fails to explain why there is a lower amount of merger announcements made of 
Fridays compared to Wednesdays and Thursdays (Louis and Sun (2010)). This applies to my 
sample as well. 
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2.10 Merger Monday 
A directly linked topic to weekday variations in corporate announcements, is the Wall Street 
Merger Monday phenomenon. Also described in Louis and Sun (2010), see e.g. Kramer (1995 
p. C9). According to the general impression, companies announce mergers and acquisitions at 
the beginning of the week to achieve a maximum amount of publicity and attention to the 
transactions. As documented in Louis and Sun (2010), managers who make M&A 
announcements at the beginning of the week, often state this as the reason indeed. While 
managers are not directly expressing that they avoid e.g. Friday announcements, due to limited 
investor attention, it implies a lower perceived level of investor attention at the end of the week 
and on Fridays. 
There have been some interesting and somewhat contradicting more recent news coverage on 
the Merger Monday phenomenon.9 In a Bloomberg video article the representative makes some 
noteworthy statements, such as “… we always refer to Monday as Merger Monday, and if you 
don’t have a busy Merger Monday, you usually think that the rest of the week is going to be 
quiet”.10 According to the article, most M&A transactions up to that point in 2015, had been 
announced on Wednesdays, based on deal value. Based on volume, most deals were announced 
on Tuesdays. The correspondent does not give a clear explanation to the shift from Monday to 
Tuesday and Wednesday. However, she offers a theory about markets being so volatile in 2015 
that Monday is perhaps a good day to assess the week, and if it’s the kind of environment 
companies want to announce a big merger in. She also mentions that Friday is showing 
surprisingly much activity, which is unexpected “because Friday used to be the day that 
companies would try to bury the bad news before the weekend”.  
The actual distributions offered for number of transactions announced year-to-date (May 13, 
2015) are 21.5 %, 22.3 %, 20.0 %, 19.1 %, 14.7 %, 0.9 %, and 1.6 % from Monday through 
Sunday respectively. Compared to my sample, and that of Louis and Sun (2010), they show a 
lower distribution of deals announced on Mondays, but not clearly higher or lower for Fridays. 
Perhaps more interesting than the limited data offered in the article, is the implication of 
managers strategic timing of M&A deals according to market sentiment.  
                                                          
9 Udland, M. 2016. Over $37 billion in deals has been announced in a massive 'Merger Monday'. Business Insider 
UK (March 21), http://uk.businessinsider.com/merger-monday-march-21-2016-3?r=US&IR=T. 
10 Lachapelle, T. 2015. Has Merger Monday Moved to Wednesday? Bloomberg (May 13), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-05-13/has-merger-monday-moved-to-wednesday-. 
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Another 2015 news report by MarketWatch, Inc., states that Merger Monday has shifted 
towards Tuesday and Wednesday, or even Thursday.11 The article includes some interesting 
points from Mark Oshima, senior vice president of business integration at Aon Hewitt Plc. In 
accordance to the previous article, he theorizes that companies might wait an extra day or two 
to get a feel of the market, and if they can expect a favorable announcement reaction. He states 
that “you might see a bit of a correlation there”. However, perhaps the most interesting 
comments come from Tom Herd, a managing director at Accenture Plc. He sees that the rise of 
social media has increased fears of M&A developments leaking out before official company 
announcements. Thus, companies are prompted to announce deals when they are ready, rather 
than wait. He also states that “I think the ability to wait to place it on a Monday morning is 
being cut off… I think controlling the information is part of the reason”. This reasoning could 
offer some explanation to a possible shift from Monday announcements to other weekdays. 
Contrary to the previous articles, CNBC reports that the weakening of the Merger Monday 
effect has been widely exaggerated.12 The article presents the percentage distribution of 1995-
2015 announced U.S. M&A deals valued at more than $1 billion.13 The proportion of Monday 
announcements is considerably high, e.g. 37 % during 2014 and 33 % year-to-date (August 17, 
2015). The yearly numbers of announcements drop consistently towards Friday, with a few 
exceptions. On average, the portions of Monday announcements, are clearly higher than those 
reported in Louis and Sun (2010). The average distributions of Friday announcements are also 
lower.14 For the whole sample, the averages are 35.5 %, 19.5 %, 15.1 %, 15.7 %, 10.7 %, 0.7 
%, 3,0 % from Monday to Sunday respectively. 
The article also presents some interesting notions about M&A announcements and other 
corporate announcements. Neil Dhar, a partner from PwC, states that “strategy behind 
scheduling an M&A announcement usually has more to do with other corporate calendar 
events”. Among those listed are avoiding conflicts with product launches, getting ahead of a 
leak and quarterly earnings announcements. This makes very much sense, but especially 
                                                          
11 Britt, R. 2015. ‘Merger Monday’ now falls on Tuesday, Wednesday or even Thursday. MarketWatch (May 27), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/merger-monday-now-falls-on-tuesday-wednesday-or-even-thursday-2015-
05-27. 
12 Chemi, E. and Wells, N. 2015. The truth about Merger Monday. CNBC (August 17), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/17/the-truth-about-merger-monday.html. 
13 Even higher Monday distributions for smaller transactions are stated, although the data is not presented. Thus, 
this claim cannot be accepted at face value. 
14 In my sample, the merger announcement distribution of public targets is lower on Fridays compared to the 
equivalent of private targets. Here, the whole 1994-2014 sample period is considered, presented further on in the 
descriptive statistics section. 
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quarterly earnings announcements are of interest in this study. Surely, a company would avoid 
announcing an M&A transaction colliding with their own quarterly earnings announcement to 
receive maximum attention to the deal. However, the comments also imply that quarterly 
earnings announcements could be a potential source of investor distraction. This lends some 
credit to the notion that, a high amount of earnings announcements occurring at the same time, 
could distract investors. 
For further comparison, I divide my stock swap merger sample to two periods, 1994-2006 and 
2007-2014 (see Appendixes 2 and 3). I select the cutoff as December 2006, since the study of 
Louis and Sun (2010) covers the time period 1994-2006 (see Louis and Sun (2010) for the exact 
distributions). Comparing these, I find that the percentage shares of transactions have rather 
increased on Mondays, as well as Thursdays. This applies for both public and private targets. 
The percentage shares of Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday announcements have decreased. The 
distribution of observations is heavily favored towards the beginning of the 1994-2014 period 
(see Appendix 1). In my subsamples, the time period of 1994-2006 includes 2 496 observations. 
The respective figure for 2007-2014 is 337. However, they do highlight variations in 
distributions over different time periods. The increase in Thursday announcements is somewhat 
puzzling, whereas Friday announcements have decreased. 
The strategic timing of deals might have increased during recent years – although the news 
leakage argument works against this - but does not seem to go in favor of Fridays at the least. 
Perhaps Friday is still widely regarded as a low investor attention day, due to the upcoming 
weekend and other effects. Overall, news stories seem to be partly driven by gut feeling, 
generalizations and attention grabbing headlines. There might be a shift during recent years 
from Monday deal announcements to Tuesdays and Wednesday. But with my sample spanning 
to the end of 2014 and covering stock swap mergers only, the theories and claims are hard to 
definitively either confirm or deny. 
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3. Data 
In this section, I will go through the process of collecting the stock swap merger announcement 
sample, along with which data items are included in the sample. The section also covers some 
descriptive notions about my sample, and limitations of the data used in my study.  
 
3.1 Merger announcements 
My thesis contains announcements of stock swap mergers between U.S. companies, made 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2014. It includes stock swap announcements, where 
the acquirer’s status is public and the target’s status is either public or private. The sample for 
mergers is obtained from the Security Data Company (SDC) database. 
As per the study by Louis and Sun (2010), a transaction is deemed a stock swap, if more than 
50 % of its value is financed with stock. An observation is included in the sample, if the method 
of payment and transaction value are reported on SDC, the form of the transaction is a merger 
(as defined on SDC), the acquisition technique is defined as a stock swap, deal status is 
completed, and the transaction value is at least 5 million dollars.  
The initial sample from SDC includes 6 095 stock swap announcements (3 084 public targets 
and 3 009 private targets). There are however multiple observations, where the percentage of 
stock used is below 50 %. After adjusting for these observations, the sample size drops 
somewhat to 5 731 stock swap announcements (2 848 public and 2 883 private targets).  
In the initial SDC sample, the average stock financing is 91.94 % for public targets and 94.05 
% for private targets. The initial average total transaction values, are 1 732 million USD for 
public targets and 107 million USD for private targets. Respectively, the median total 
transaction values, are 165 million USD for public targets and 29 million USD for private 
targets. For example, the largest deal in the initial sample, is the stock swap merger between 
America Online Inc. and Time Warner, announced 10.1.2000, with a total transaction value of 
164 747 million USD. 
 
38 
 
3.2 Quarterly earnings announcements and stock data 
The sample for publicly listed companies’ earnings announcements in North America, is 
gathered from the Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly (RDQ - Report date of quarterly 
earnings) database, and requirements follow the approach of Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). 
Quarterly earnings announcement data, is used to calculate the daily number of quarterly 
earnings announcements. To calculate both merger announcement abnormal returns and trading 
volumes, necessary daily stock data is gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. Acquiring firms’ 6 digit Cusip identifiers from the SDC sample, are 
converted to CRSP 8 digit Cusip identifiers. I include firms that have a CRSP share code of 10 
in my sample. Thus, only ordinary common shares are included. 
 
3.3 Balance sheet items 
To maximize the sample size, I have chosen not to require Compustat data – e.g. net income, 
total assets – for the acquiring firms in my univariate tests with the CRSP matched SDC sample. 
The primary focus in this study is to test for the inattention hypothesis, if a higher number of 
earnings announcements during stock swap merger announcement days causes a muted market 
reaction. I.e. if there is an underreaction effect caused by investor distraction, limited investor 
attention.  
However, as Louis and Sun (2010) find statistically significant regression coefficients for size, 
relative size and book-to-market when the dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal 
returns and trading volumes, I include these as control variables in my multivariate subsample 
regression analysis tests. More specifically. lnsize (size) is the natural log of the acquirer’s total 
market value of equity 20 days prior to the merger announcement; relsize (relative size) is the 
ratio of the transaction’s total value to the acquirer’s market value of equity 20 days prior to the 
merger announcement; bm is the acquirer’s book-to-market value of equity at the end of the 
quarter prior to the merger announcement (Louis and Sun (2010)). Acquirers’ market values of 
equity are gathered from CRSP. Acquirers’ book values of equity are gathered from the 
Compustat Fundamentals Monthly database, using the CEQ (60) data item. 
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3.4 Sample for the univariate tests 
After matching the SDC sample with CRSP, the final sample includes 2 833 stock swap 
announcements (1 529 public and 1 304 private targets). I have chosen to exclude transactions, 
where the acquirers’ stock value is below 1 USD prior to the merger announcement. This does 
not considerably affect the sample as the final sample size would have been 2 841 stock swap 
announcements (1 531 public and 1310 private targets), without the consideration. 
After matching the SDC data with the CRSP database, the daily numbers of quarterly earnings 
announcements are assigned to the corresponding merger announcement dates. The specific 
daily numbers of quarterly earnings announcements are sorted according to their decile rank of 
announcements made during the same quarter. Days that are in the top (bottom) decile of 
earnings announcements during the same quarter, are categorized as “high-news days” and 
“low-news days”, in line with Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009).  
An alternative approach of categorizing the specific days as high-news days and low-news days 
could be taken, when sorting the final sample, i.e. categorizing based on the daily number of 
earnings announcements across the whole time period of 1994-2014. However, this would not 
take into account the differences in the number of daily earnings announcements, during 
different quarters and years. Thus, the method of sorting according to the announcement 
quarter, takes into account the relative information load investors face during the specific 
quarter.  
In the case of stock swaps involving privately owned targets, there is one observation with some 
missing trading volume values. Thus, the trading volume sample size is one observation lower, 
than the sample used for calculating differences in abnormal returns. This observation is the 
stock swap merger between HomeSeekers.com Inc. and Terradatum Llc, announced on 
September 22, 1999. 
 
3.4 Sample for the multivariate tests 
After collecting book-to-market value of equity data for the acquirers, the sample size for my 
multivariate regression tests drops somewhat, to a total of 2 574 observations – 1 222 for stock 
swaps involving privately owned targets, and 1 352 for stock swaps involving publicly owned 
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targets. In total, 259 observations are omitted from my univariate test sample – 82 when the 
target’s status is private, and 177 when the target’s status is public.  
 
3.5 Limitations of the data 
The final sample size for my univariate tests, is significantly lower than that of Louis and Sun 
(2010), even though the time period considered in my sample is 8 years longer. This is likely 
to a large part, due to my study only including CRSP share code 10 observations. Thus, CRSP 
share code 11 observations are omitted. The sample of Louis and Sun (2010) includes 3 995 
stock swap announcements in total – 2 227 for public targets and 1 764 for private targets. 
Nevertheless, my final sample includes observations for years that are not included in their 
sample, i.e. years 2007-2014. As reported further on in the descriptive statistics section, the 
number of stock swap deals have dropped considerably after the 1998-2002 time period, for 
both public and private targets. Thus, although my sample includes observations during 2007-
2014, the earlier years are heavily favored in terms of number of observations.  
Ultimately, the most important aspect of my study is to find the necessary daily stock data from 
CRSP, to calculate both acquirers’ merger announcement abnormal returns and trading 
volumes, which is why I have chosen to exclude additional Compustat requirements for the 
main sample. The multivariate tests are carried out for the subsample, to test whether the 
univariate results hold, when controlling for the acquirers’ size, book-to-market values and the 
relative size of the transactions. 
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4. Methods 
In this section, I will go through the methods used, to carry out the tests for a potential muted 
market reaction regarding stock swap announcements on Fridays and high-news days. The 
primary focus is to test for the investor distraction hypothesis, i.e. if a higher number of earnings 
announcements occurring during the same day as a stock swap merger announcement, causes 
a muted market reaction. Both acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes and returns are considered. 
I additionally study the Friday phenomenon, as in Louis and Sun (2010), to observe if there is 
a muted market reaction to merger announcements made on Fridays. The main aim here is to 
replicate their study, for comparative purposes. 
 
4.1 Quarterly earnings announcements 
Quarterly earnings announcement data is used to calculate the daily number of quarterly 
earnings announcements. As described earlier, the days that are in the top and bottom decile for 
the daily number of earnings announcement, during the same quarter, are categorized as high-
news days and low-news days respectively. The approach follows that of Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009). 
 
4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns 
The abnormal, excess return of a stock is defined as: 
(1) 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of the firm’s stock i at the time period t, 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected return of 
the firm’s stock i at the time period t, and 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal, excess return for the firm’s 
stock i at the time period t. The 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) component, expected return of a security can be 
estimated using different models. Some examples include the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) or Fama-French Three-Factor Model (FF3FM). See, e.g. Sharpe (1964), Fama and 
French (1992, 1993). In this study I use the CRSP value-weighted index return for a given stock 
I at the time period t, as its expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡). This approach is also used in Louis and Sun 
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(2010). The CRSP value-weighted index, is a value-weighted portfolio built each calendar 
period using all issues listed on The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), The American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and The Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ), with available share volume 
and price data, excluding American Depositary Receipts.15 
To calculate cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1, I use the following approach: 
(2) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  ∏ (1 +  𝑅𝑖𝑡) −  ∏ (1 +  𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑉𝑊)𝑖𝑡=0  
𝑖
𝑡=0  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of the firm’s stock i at the time period t, 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑉𝑊is the CRSP value-weighted 
return of the firm’s stock i at the time period t, and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return of 
the firm’s stock i over the 2-day window (0,+1) around the announcement. 
 
4.3 Abnormal trading volumes 
I calculate abnormal trading volumes according to the following formula:  
(3) 𝑉𝑂𝐿[𝑗] = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡+𝑗 + 1) −
1
10
 ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑘 + 1)
𝑡−11
𝑘=𝑡−20  
where abnormal trading volume on day j relative to the announcement date t is defined as a 
normalized difference between the log dollar volume on day j and the average log dollar volume 
over days [-20, -11] (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009)). The abnormal trading volume over 
days 0 and +1 is calculated, as the average of abnormal trading volumes on the announcement 
day (VOL[0]) and the next day (VOL[1]). I.e. abnormal trading volume for the 2-day event 
window is defined, as the average of abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 relative to 
the merger announcement date (day 0). A similar approach is used in DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009), and I use their approach of benchmarking for days -20 through -11. Hirshleifer, Lim, 
and Teoh (2009) calculate trading volumes over days -41 to -11.  
 
 
                                                          
15 http://www.cob.unt.edu/firel/data/stock_ind_data_descriptions.pdf 
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4.4 Univariate analysis 
I perform univariate analysis, to study the hypothesized muted market reaction effect, using t-
tests for differences in means. More specifically, I test whether, on average, bidders’ abnormal 
returns and trading volumes for stock swap announcements on high-news days, differ 
significantly from bidders’ abnormal returns and trading volumes, when stock swaps are 
announced on low-news days and non-high-news days. As earlier mentioned, the control groups 
are thus low-news days and all non-high-news days. The t-tests are carried out separately for 
stock swaps that involve private and public targets. 
In similar fashion, t-tests for mean differences are carried out between Friday and non-Friday 
bidders, in stock-for-stock merger announcements. Separately for transaction that involve 
private and public targets. Here, there is only one control group, namely non-Friday. This 
approach is the same that Louis and Sun (2010) use. 
It is important to note, that the t-tests for differences in mean, assume unequal variances. This 
is the approach Louis and Sun (2010) have used, when studying the Friday investor inattention 
hypothesis. Ex-ante, it is not entirely clear, why this should be the case. Louis and Sun (2010) 
provide no further explanation as to the reason, except for providing the information in their 
table descriptions. However, assuming equal variances in the univariate t-tests does not 
materially affect my results – and neither their results. 
As a final notion, dates categorized as high-news days, very rarely occur during Fridays. In my 
sample, for stock swaps involving privately owned targets, the figure is 0.54 % (7 out of 1 304 
observations). When target status is public, the figure is 0.13 % (2 out of 1 529 observations). 
Thus, Fridays should be relatively well controlled for, even in my univariate t-tests for mean 
differences between high-news days and low-news days/non-high-news day. The same applies 
vice versa. 
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4.5 Multivariate analysis 
I perform multivariate OLS regression tests, to control for other possible determinants and 
distinguish between the effects of Fridays and high-news days. In the tests, I have included the 
variables lnsize, relsize and bm, since Louis and Sun (2010) find statistically significant values 
for the determinants in their multivariate tests. These are defined as the natural log of the 
acquirer’s total market value of equity 20 days prior to the merger announcement, the ratio of 
the transaction’s total value to the acquirer’s market value of equity 20 days prior to the merger 
announcement, and the acquirer’s book-to-market value of equity at the end of the quarter prior 
to the merger announcement (Louis and Sun (2010)). In my multivariate sample, dates 
categorized as high-news days, occur according to the same percentages as presented in the 
univariate analysis Section 4.4. Thus, none of these observations have been excluded. 
I perform multivariate regression tests for abnormal returns and trading volumes, where the 
dependent variables are the average cumulative abnormal returns and average abnormal trading 
volume over days 0 and +1. These are performed for stock swap merger announcements 
involving both publicly and privately owned targets.  
highnews is a binary variable taking the value of 1, if the merger announcement occurs on a 
high-news day (top decile of daily number of quarterly earnings announcements), and 0 
otherwise. Respectively, friday is a binary variable taking the value of 1, if the merger 
announcement occurs on a Friday, and 0 otherwise. The formulas are defined as: 
(4) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽5𝑏𝑚 +  𝜀𝑖 
(5) 𝐴𝑇𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽5𝑏𝑚 +  𝜀𝑖 
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5. Empirical findings 
This section presents my empirical findings of the tests carried out, along with descriptive 
statistics. The first part covers descriptive statistics of the earnings announcement and the stock 
swap merger announcement sample. Second, I present my univariate findings in regard to the 
proposed investor distraction hypothesis on high-news days. Third, I go through my univariate 
results for the proposed investor inattention hypothesis on Fridays. Last, I present the results of 
my multivariate tests with the control variables lnsize, relsize, bm.   
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1: Quarterly distribution of quarterly earnings announcements from January 1994 to 
December 2014 
 
The figure above presents the quarterly distribution of quarterly earnings announcement from 
January 1994 to December 2014, in North America. The time period covers 722 111 quarterly 
earnings announcements in total. As can be seen, the number of quarterly earnings 
announcements peak during the 2000-2002 time period at approx. 12 000. This is in line with 
historical data about the number of publicly listed companies in North America. The amount of 
quarterly earnings announcements has declined somewhat since then, presumably due to the 
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decrease of U.S. stock market listings since 1999.16 According to the Wall Street Journal, the 
amount of U.S. stock market listings increased in 2013 for the first time since 1999. This is 
consistent with the figure above, where the number of quarterly earnings announcements have 
increased during the 2012-2014 time period. 
The yearly and quarterly variations in the number of quarterly earnings announcements are not 
an issue in my study, since I group high-news days and low-news days, i.e. top and bottom 
deciles for daily number of earnings announcements, according to the distribution of daily 
earnings announcements during the specific fiscal announcement quarter. Thus, a day receives 
the high-news day (high distraction day) status, when it is in the top decile in the number of 
earnings announcements during the specific quarter (e.g. 1999Q1). This improves the analysis, 
compared to grouping days according to the daily distribution of earnings announcements 
during the whole sample period of 1994 to 2014, and better measures the relative information 
load that investors face during the specific quarter and date. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) 
also use this method. 
 
Table 1: Quarterly earnings announcement descriptive statistics 1994-2014 
Panel A: Distribution of daily number of quarterly earnings announcements   
  Percentiles 
Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
136.7 145.1 23.0 39.0 84.0 186.0 325.0 
Panel B: Percentage share of quarterly earnings announcements per month   
January February March April May June  
6.1 % 9.4 % 7.2 % 10.9 % 13.6 % 2.4 %  
July August September October November December  
9.9 % 13.1 % 2.3 % 9.9 % 12.8 % 2.4 %  
Panel C: Percentage share of quarterly earnings announcements per weekday   
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday   
17.2 % 21.5 % 22.5 % 25.4 % 13.4 %     
The table presents the average and median values, standard deviation and percentile distribution 
of the daily number of quarterly earnings announcements from January 1994 to December 2014, 
along with percentage distributions across months and weekdays. 
                                                          
16 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304851104579363272107177430 
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The descriptive values in Panel A are close to those presented in Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009), although somewhat higher. Their study covers the time period of 1995 to 2004. My 
study covers 10 additional years, 2005-2015, so the data presented varies somewhat. 
The number of quarterly earnings announcements is lowest on Fridays. This is also the case for 
merger announcements. The implication is that Fridays are statistically likelier to be low-news 
days in my sample, which also holds on the basis of merger announcement distributions across 
weekdays. As earlier presented, the distributions of high-news days occurring on Fridays are 
0.54 % and 0.13 %, when target status is private and public. 
The Friday inattention phenomenon should thus be relatively well controlled for, even in my 
univariate tests. If the Friday inattention hypothesis holds, this can actually work against my 
hypothesis of a muted market reaction to stock swap merger announcements made on high-
news days. This, because Fridays can decrease investor attention during low-news days and 
non-high-news days, i.e. causing a muted market response when stock swap mergers are 
announced on these dates. However, this is controlled for in the multivariate tests. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of stock swap merger announcements 
  Public target Private target Total 
Number of observations 1 529 1 304 2 833 
Percentage of the sample 54.0 % 46.0 % 100.0 % 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of merger announcements according to the acquirer’s public 
and private status. The total number of merger announcements between January 1994 and 
December 2014 is 2 833. The percentage distributions are quite close to those that Louis and 
Sun (2010) report. Their values are 55.8 % for public targets and 44.2 % for private targets. 
Thus, even though my sample size is smaller, the percentage distributions of merger 
announcements between private and public targets vary very little from those reported in Louis 
and Sun (2010). 
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Table 3: Daily distribution of the merger announcement sample 
Panel A: Distribution for public targets 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
454 308 284 277 206 
Percentage of 
the sample 
29.69 % 20.14 % 18.57 % 18.12 % 13.47 % 
Panel B: Distribution for private targets 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
292 308 252 255 197 
Percentage of 
the sample 
22.39 % 23.62 % 19.33 % 19.56 % 15.11 % 
Panel C: Distribution for all targets 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
746 616 536 532 403 
Percentage of 
the sample 
26.33 % 21.74 % 18.92 % 18.78 % 14.23 % 
 
As can be seen from Table 3 above, the percentage share of Friday merger announcements is 
clearly lowest. For the whole sample, the share of Friday announcements is 14.23 %. The high 
share of Monday announcements in the case of public targets is interesting, since it deviates 
considerably from the ex-ante expected 20 % share. A possible explanation is the reported 
Merger Monday phenomenon, whereby firms seek to achieve maximum publicity for their 
deals, i.e. expecting that investor attention is high at the beginning of the week. Especially for 
the largest deals, this is a distinct possibility. However, there are some contradicting news 
reports about the persistence of the Merger Monday phenomenon, as presented in the earlier 
Prior Literature section. 
Another interesting observation is the higher percentage share of Tuesday announcements 
compared to that of Monday, in the case of merger announcements that involve privately owned 
targets. This is also the case in Louis and Sun (2010), although the difference they report is 
even smaller. Also, the distribution from Monday through Thursday is closer to the ex-ante 20 
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% expectation. A possible explanation is that these deals receive considerably less publicity, 
compared to those of public targets, although the beginning of the week is still favored. This 
can somewhat decrease managers’ incentive towards strategic timing of deals to Mondays and 
the beginning of the week.  
If public acquirers of private targets expect the largest deals to be announced on Mondays, a 
higher share of firms may seek to announce transactions from Tuesday forward, to avoid going 
unnoticed in the favor of larger deals. I.e. announcement timing strategy might be more reactive, 
dependent on the weekday merger announcement distribution of larger public transactions. For 
example, in my sample the average total transaction value is some 8.6 times higher when target 
status is public, compared to that of private (see Table 4). However, as can be seen from the 
median values there is considerable dispersion in total transaction values. The smaller 
transactions are likely to receive less media attention and possibly as a result experience reduced 
investor attention. The minimum transaction values being close to 5 million USD is expected, 
since this is the sample selection cutoff criteria that I have used. The largest transaction in the 
whole sample is the over 58 billion dollar merger between JPMorgan Chase & Co and Bank 
One Corp, Chicago, IL, announced 14.1.2004. 
 
Table 4: Stock swap merger sample transaction values (million USD) 
 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets  
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
Mean 101.48  873.81 
Median 29.20  103.73 
Min 5.00  5.25 
Max 19467.71   58663.15 
 
For the whole sample, the distribution of merger announcements across weekdays is consistent 
with that of Louis and Sun (2010). Thus, even though my sample size is smaller, the weekday 
characteristics still hold on an aggregate level. Monday and Friday distributions clearly deviate 
from the ex-ante expected 20 % share, and the number of announcements consistently decrease 
from Monday through Friday. 
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5.2 High-news day merger announcement differential abnormal returns 
The acquirers’ abnormal returns are calculated, as defined in equations (1) and (2). The 
expected return for a stock i during the time period t, is its CRSP value-weighted index return. 
I.e. acquirers’ returns are proxied by the market-adjusted returns, as in Louis and Sun (2010), 
using the CRSP value-weighted index. I compare the abnormal returns for high-news days with 
both low-news days and all non-high-news days. 
 
Table 5: Acquirers’ average cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1 
Merger 
announcement day 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
Low-news days 
0.0300 
[4.67***] 
(N = 126) 
-0.0207 
[-4.65***] 
(N = 161) 
All non-high-news days 
0.0167 
[6.27***] 
(N = 1151) 
-0.0183 
[-9.72***] 
(N = 1345) 
High-news days 
0.0044 
[0.53] 
(N = 153) 
-0.0208 
[-4.90] 
(N = 184) 
High-news days - 
Low-news days 
-0.0256 
[-2.43**] 
0.0000 
[-0.01] 
High-news days - All 
non-high-news days 
-0.0123 
[-1.40*] 
-0.0025 
[-0.53] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
 
On an aggregate level, the signs of the average cumulative abnormal returns are consistent with 
prior studies reporting an average negative (positive) market reaction to announcements of 
stock swap deals involving publicly (privately) owned targets (Chang (1998); Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller (2002); Louis (2005); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005); Louis and 
Sun (2010)). The differences in average cumulative abnormal returns show statistically 
significant t-values for stock swaps involving privately owned targets at the 5 % and 10 % level. 
The difference increases when high-news days are compared against low-news days, in lieu of 
all non-high-news days. All non-high-news days is the equivalent of the difference between all 
merger announcement days and high-news days. There seems to be a muted market reaction in 
regard to stock swaps involving privately owned targets during high-news days. 
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Stock swaps involving publicly owned targets do not exhibit a similar pattern. This is somewhat 
surprising. If there is a muted market reaction for merger announcements involving privately 
owned targets, one could expect the investor distraction phenomenon to persist in the case of 
stock swap announcements of publicly owned targets. A possible explanation is that the sizes 
of the acquirers and transactions are on average much larger and receive sufficient news 
coverage and media attention. I.e. the merger announcements are such high-priority news that 
they do not get buried beneath earnings announcement news.  
For example, Louis and Sun (2010) report that the Friday muted market reaction effect seems 
larger for smaller acquirers. An acquirer’s size is not perfectly correlated with total transaction 
value, but small acquirers seldom announce multibillion dollar mergers. Hence, there is a 
correlation between transaction values and the sizes of acquirers (e.g. market capitalization). 
 
Table 6: Acquirers' average daily abnormal returns 
 Stock swaps involving privately owned targets 
  
Low-news 
days 
(N = 126) 
Non-high- 
news days 
(N = 1151) 
High-news 
days 
(N = 153) 
High-news 
days - 
Low-news 
days 
High-news days - 
Non-high-news 
days 
Day -1 
0.0069 
[1.82*] 
0.0051 
[3.88***] 
0.0046 
[0.81] 
-0.0023 
[-0.33] 
-0.0004 
[-0.08] 
Day 0 
0.0129 
[3.03***] 
0.0110 
[6.57***] 
0.0059 
[1.12] 
-0.0070 
[-1.04] 
-0.0051 
[-0.92] 
Day +1 
0.0176 
[3.17***] 
0.0053 
[3.12***] 
-0.0024 
[-0.44] 
-0.020 
[-2.57**] 
-0.0077 
[-1,35] 
 Stock swaps involving publicly owned targets 
  
Low-news 
days 
(N = 161) 
Non-high- 
news days 
(N = 1345) 
High-news 
days 
(N = 184) 
High-news 
days - 
Low-news 
days 
High-news days - 
Non-high-news 
days 
Day -1 
-0.0016 
[-0.62] 
-0.0003 
[-0.35] 
0.0062 
[2.76***] 
0.0078 
[2.26**] 
0.0064 
[2.73***] 
Day 0 
-0.0153 
[-4.30***] 
-0.0136 
[-9.40***] 
-0.0129 
[-4.12] 
0.0024 
[0.50] 
0.0007 
[0.19] 
Day +1 
-0.0054 
[-1.88*] 
-0.0047 
[-3.59***] 
-0.0077 
[-2.24**] 
-0.0023 
[-0.50] 
-0.0030 
[-0.82] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
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For the acquirers of privately owned targets, the high-news day differentials are more 
pronounced for day +1 after the merger announcement. They are not statistically significant for 
days 0 or -1. Nor for day +1, when comparing high-news days and non-high-news days. Also, 
the acquirers’ average abnormal returns during high-news days on day +1 are negative. Even 
though the differential values on the announcement date (day 0) are not statistically significant, 
the acquirers’ average abnormal returns on high-news days are lower to those of low-news days 
or non-high-news days. I.e. for stock swaps involving privately owned targets the observed 
daily abnormal return pattern on days 0 and +1 is consistent with the investor distraction 
hypothesis.  
For stock swaps involving privately owned targets, the pattern of acquirers’ abnormal returns 
on high-news days and non-high-news days between day 0 and day +1, is also similar to what 
Louis and Sun (2010) report for Friday and non-Friday merger announcements. All non-high 
news days show a decrease in acquirers’ abnormal returns between day 0 and +1. The effect is 
opposite for merger announcements on low-news days. This is somewhat surprising. One could 
expect the same effect to occur for low-news days. However, on a cumulative level, the reported 
pattern of acquirers’ abnormal returns involving stock swaps of privately owned targets, 
appears to be in line with the investor distraction hypothesis of Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009).  
For stock swaps involving publicly owned targets, the results are quite different. All average 
abnormal returns are negative for days 0 and +1, in line with e.g. Chang (1998). I.e. there is on 
average a negative market reaction to stock swap announcement involving publicly owned 
targets. The high-news day differentials show statistically significant values for the day before 
the merger announcement, but not for the window (0,+1). There is a slightly less negative 
reaction for high-news days on the announcement date (day 0). The average negative abnormal 
return for low-news days is also higher than that of all non-high-news days. If investor 
distraction is not as strong during low-news days, this should be the case. 
The negative differential for acquirers’ average abnormal returns on high-news days and the 
other days is harder to interpret. Across days 0 and +1, the average negative abnormal returns 
decrease, but less so for high-news days. Based on these insignificant results it is hard to rule 
out other determinants that affect the merger announcement returns.  
A further test of the previous and following trading days’ high-news or low-news status would 
be of interest, since it would possibly help explain some of the noted patterns. Also, if there are 
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other mergers and acquisitions announcements and/or earnings surprises made during the same 
or the following date. For example, same day M&A announcements of other large deals could 
increase investor distraction.  
Considering possible leakage of announcement information, the interpretation of the 
announcement window (-1,+1) abnormal returns are different for stock swaps involving 
privately and publicly owned targets. For privately owned targets, the high-news day acquirers’ 
average abnormal returns are less positive compared to other days. The high news day 
differential values are not statistically significant. This does not support the leakage theory.  
For stock swaps involving publicly owned targets the case is different. The high-news day 
differential values of the acquirers’ average abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 
5 % and 1 % level. Based on these results, possible prior leakage of merger announcement 
information involving publicly owned targets, cannot completely be ruled out. However, the 
positive average abnormal returns do not support the findings of prior literature (e.g. Chang 
(1998), in that if information was leaked, the price reaction should, on average, be negative.  
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) examine 30-day abnormal returns prior to earnings surprise 
announcements, and do not find a significant difference for high-news days and low-news days. 
However, merger announcements differ in regard to earnings surprises, and earnings news in 
general, in that they are largely unanticipated events. Thus, the authors’ findings are not directly 
applicable in this setting. 
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5.3 High-news day merger announcement differential abnormal trading volumes 
The calculation of abnormal trading volumes follows the methods of DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009), Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), Louis and Sun (2010), as defined in equation (3). 
The acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes on high-news days (top decile of quarterly earnings 
announcements) are compared with both all non-high-news days and low-news days (bottom 
decile of quarterly earnings announcements). 
 
Table 7: Acquirers’ average abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 
Merger 
announcement day 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
Low-news days 
0.2055 
[4.38***] 
(N = 126) 
0.3794 
[10.30***] 
(N = 161) 
All non-high-news days 
0.1761 
[10.25***] 
(N = 1150) 
0.4002 
[26.23***] 
(N = 1345) 
High-news days 
0.2525 
[6.10***] 
(N = 153) 
0.2683 
[6.99***] 
(N = 184) 
High-news days - 
Low-news days 
0.0470 
[0.75] 
-0.1111 
[-2.09**] 
High-news days - All 
non-high-news days 
0.0763 
[1.70*] 
-0.1318 
[-3.19***] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
 
For stock swaps involving publicly owned targets, the differences in the acquirers’ average 
abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1, between high-news days and low-news 
days/non-high-news days, are negative and statistically significant at the 5 % and 1 % level. It 
is interesting that the differential for high-news days and low-news days is smaller than that of 
high-news days and non-high-news days. This does not fully support the distraction effect, 
whereby investor attention is presumably higher during low-news days, i.e. investor attention 
is closer to the optimal level. 
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Respectively, for stock swaps involving privately owned targets, the differential in the 
acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes between high-news days and all non-high-news days is 
positive, and statistically significant at the 10 % level. The differential to low-news days is also 
positive, but not statistically significant. I.e. the differential in average values are smaller when 
comparing with low-news days. According to the investor distraction hypothesis, high-news 
days would exhibit lower average abnormal trading volumes over days (0, +1), when comparing 
against low-news days and non-high-news days. These results do not support the hypothesis of 
a muted market reaction over days 0 and +1. 
 
Table 8: Acquirers' average daily abnormal trading volumes 
 Privately owned targets 
  
Low-news 
days 
(N = 126) 
Non-high- 
news days 
(N = 1150) 
High- news 
days 
(N = 153) 
High-news 
days - 
Low-news days 
High-news days - 
Non-high-news 
days 
Day -1 
0.0383 
[0.76] 
0.0352 
[1.79*] 
0.1041 
[2.20**] 
0.0658 
[0.95] 
0.0689 
[1.34] 
Day 0 
0.1813 
[3.43***] 
0.1622 
[8.22***] 
0.2491 
[5.19***] 
0.0678 
[0.95] 
0.0869 
[1.68*] 
Day +1 
0.2297 
[4.21***] 
0.1900 
[9.11***] 
0.2558 
[5.34***] 
0.0261 
[0.36] 
0.0658 
[1.26] 
 Publicly owned targets 
  
Low-news 
days 
(N = 161) 
Non-high- 
news days 
(N = 1345) 
High- news 
days 
(N = 184) 
High-news 
days - 
Low-news days 
High-news days - 
Non-high-news 
days 
Day -1 
0.1146 
[2.91***] 
0.0663 
[3.69***] 
-0.0150 
[-0.36] 
-0.1296 
[-2.25**] 
-0.0812 
[-1.78**] 
Day 0 
0.4053 
[9.89***] 
0.3832 
[19.86***] 
0.2404 
[5.09***] 
-0.1649 
[-2.63***] 
-0.1427 
[-2.80***] 
Day +1 
0.3535 
[8.99***] 
0.4171 
[23.94***] 
0.2962 
[6.76***] 
-0.0573 
[-0.97] 
-0.1209 
[-2.56**] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
 
For stock swaps involving publicly owned targets, acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes are on 
average lower on all days (-1,+1), when comparing high-news days and low-news days/non-
high-news days. The high-news day differentials are largest during day 0, but also statistically 
significant on day -1, when comparing with all non-high-news days.  
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According to these results, the acquirers’ daily abnormal trading volumes are lower on high-
news days, when stock swaps involve publicly owned targets. The interesting effect, is the 
smaller difference in the acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes, between high-news days and 
low-news days, compared to that of high-news days and all non-high-news days. The difference 
stems primarily from day +1 average abnormal trading volumes. This is hard to explain solely 
based on the investor distraction hypothesis. Other determinants should also be considered, 
such as those presented earlier in the abnormal returns section.  
The acquirers of privately owned targets, exhibit larger positive average abnormal returns on 
high-news days, when comparing with low-news days and all non-high-news days. This is not 
consistent with the investor distraction hypothesis, whereby high-news days can cause a muted 
trading volume response to merger announcements. Additionally, on day 0, the difference in 
the acquirers’ average abnormal trading volumes between high-news days and all non-high-
news days is positive and statistically significant at the 10 % level.  
For stock swaps involving privately owned targets, the pattern of acquirers’ statistically 
significant negative differential in average cumulative abnormal returns and positive average 
abnormal trading volumes, could be explained by higher dispersion of opinions for high-news 
day merger announcements (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). According to the authors, if the 
investor distraction hypothesis holds, the muted market response should hold for both abnormal 
returns and trading volumes, due to trading being the mechanism that causes prices to adjust.  
However, if the negative difference in abnormal returns (in their study, between Friday and 
non-Friday) is attributable to higher dispersion of opinions, the authors would expect a positive, 
rather than negative, differential in abnormal trading volume. 
Again, I consider the possible prior information leakage of merger announcements. For stock 
swaps involving publicly owned targets, the acquirers’ negative high-news day differential 
values on day -1, do not support this, although the t-values are statistically significant at the 5 
% level. If there is leakage about a deal, the negative differential during day -1 should be less 
pronounced. It could occur, due to the previous day also being a high distraction day, high-
news day. Thus, to gain further insight to the matter, the analysis should be extended. 
Respectively, for stock swaps involving privately owned targets, the differentials are positive, 
but not statistically significant. 
As a whole, the results for the acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes and returns on high-news 
days are mixed, but provide a few indications. For the acquirers, high-news days seem to cause 
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a muted price reaction, when stock swaps involve privately owned targets, and a muted volume 
reaction when stock swaps involve publicly owned targets. However, the results are not very 
robust, and other determinants should also be considered. The results suggest that the daily 
number of quarterly earnings announcements is perhaps not a very robust proxy for investor 
distraction, in the context of merger announcements. As mentioned, it would be interesting to 
extend the analysis further. E.g. the number of same day merger announcements, and the 
number of earnings announcements and surprises during the same, previous and following day 
of the merger announcement under inspection. 
 
5.4 The Friday effect 
I study the proposed Friday investor inattention phenomenon (e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009)) for comparative purposes, and to replicate the study of Louis and Sun (2010). 
 
Table 9: Acquirers’ average cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1 
Merger 
announcement day 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
Monday 
0.0186 
[3.27***] 
(N = 292) 
-0.0218 
[-7.27***] 
(N = 454) 
Tuesday 
0.0270 
[4.14***] 
(N = 308) 
-0.0199 
[-5.11***] 
(N = 308) 
Wednesday 
0.0104 
[1.83*] 
(N = 252) 
-0.0210 
[-5.44] 
(N = 284) 
Thursday 
0.0144 
[3.23***] 
(N = 255) 
-0.0161 
[-3.72***] 
(N = 277) 
All non-Friday 
0.0181 
[6.29***] 
(N = 1107) 
-0.0120 
[-10.86***] 
(N = 1323) 
Friday 
-0.0008 
[-0.18] 
(N = 197) 
-0.0099 
[-1.93*] 
(N = 206) 
Friday - non-Friday 
-0.0189 
[-3.52***] 
0.0101 
[1.86*] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
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The differences in Friday and non-Friday acquirers’ average cumulative abnormal returns, 
show statistically significant results, for stock swap merger announcements involving both 
privately (1 % level) and publicly (10 % level) owned targets. 
For Friday announcers and privately owned targets, the differential values show higher t-values 
of significance compared to Louis and Sun (2010). Respectively, for Friday announcers and 
publicly owned targets, the t-values of differences in means are less pronounced. Overall, the 
above results suggest that investor attention is lower on Fridays, i.e. that there is a muted market 
reaction to Friday merger announcements. Compared to non-Fridays, it seems that for Friday 
stock swap merger announcements, the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and 
+1, are on average, less positive when the target is privately owned, and less negative when the 
target is publicly owned. 
 
Table 10: Acquirers’ average daily abnormal returns 
 Stock swaps involving privately owned targets 
  
Friday 
(N = 197) 
Non-Friday 
(N = 1107) 
Friday - non-Friday 
Day -1 
0.0003 
[0.11] 
0.0059 
[3.90***] 
-0.0056 
[-1.93*] 
Day 0 
0.0041 
[1.23] 
0.0115 
[6.44***] 
-0.0074 
[-1.96*] 
Day +1 
-0.0050 
[-1.73*] 
0.0060 
[3.28***] 
-0.0110 
[-3.22***] 
 Stock swaps involving publicly owned targets 
  
Friday 
(N = 206) 
Non-Friday 
(N = 1323) 
Friday - non-Friday 
Day -1 
-0.0012 
[-0.58] 
0.0008 
[0.99] 
-0.0020 
[-0.88] 
Day 0 
-0.0014 
[-0.47] 
-0.0154 
[-10.56***] 
0.0140 
[4.35***] 
Day +1 
-0.0085 
[-2.11**] 
-0.0045 
[-3.57***] 
-0.0040 
[-0.95] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
 
The daily abnormal returns provide some further insight to the matter. My daily results differ 
somewhat from those of Louis and Sun (2010). For privately owned targets, the daily 
distribution of the differences in the acquirers’ average abnormal returns on Friday and non-
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Friday is similar to that of Louis and Sun (2010). This applies both for day 0 and +1, although 
the day after the merger announcement seems to be responsible for most of the effect 
(significant at the 1 % level). 
When the target’s status is public, Friday announcers’ abnormal returns, are on average, less 
negative on the announcement date (day 0), compared to non-Friday announcers, and 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. Differences in means on day -1 are similar to what 
Louis and Sun (2010) report. On day +1, the difference is negative, which differs from the 
authors results, although it is not statistically significant. There might be a slight reversal in the 
differential Friday response, the following trading day, presumably Monday. However, since 
the value is not statistically significant, it cannot be given too much weight in the analysis. 
 
Table 11: Abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 
Merger 
announcement day 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
Monday 
0.1283 
[3.68***] 
(N = 292) 
0.3889 
[16.41***] 
(N = 454) 
Tuesday 
0.2768 
[8.87***] 
(N = 308) 
0.3826 
[11.86***] 
(N = 308) 
Wednesday 
0.1578 
[4.49***] 
(N = 251) 
0.3909 
[10.39***] 
(N = 284) 
Thursday 
0.1464 
[5.22***] 
(N = 255) 
0.4058 
[12.68***] 
(N = 277) 
All non-Friday 
0.1805 
[11.02***] 
(N = 1106) 
0.3914 
[25.69***] 
(N = 1323) 
Friday 
0.2107 
[4.09***] 
(N = 197) 
0.3387 
[8.53***] 
(N = 206) 
Friday - non-Friday 
0.0302 
[0.56] 
-0.0527 
[-1.24] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
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The acquirers’ average abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 provide some mixed 
results. For the acquirers of public targets, the Friday – non-Friday differential is negative, but 
not statistically significant. It provides some indication of a possible muted market response, 
however not robust enough, to warrant verification for the results that Louis and Sun (2010) 
show. 
Respectively, for the acquirers of private targets, the equivalent differential value is positive, 
however not statistically significant. This is not consistent with the proposed Friday investor 
inattention hypothesis, and differs from the results of Louis and Sun (2010). The effect on 
trading volume is similar to the results I report for announcements of stock swap deals on high-
news days, when the target’s status is private. Again, the thoughts of DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) can provide some clarification, if the mixed results are due to dispersion of opinions. 
 
Table 12: Daily abnormal trading volumes 
 Privately owned targets 
  
Friday 
(N = 197) 
Non-Friday 
(N = 1106) 
Friday - non-Friday 
Day -1 
0.0788 
[1.25] 
0.0370 
[2.01**] 
0.0418 
[0.64] 
Day 0 
0.2171 
[3.51***] 
0.1645 
[8.86***] 
0.0526 
[0.81] 
Day +1 
0.2044 
[3.42***] 
0.1966 
[9.81***] 
0.0078 
[0.12] 
 Publicly owned targets 
  
Friday 
(N = 206) 
Non-Friday 
(N = 1323) 
Friday - non-Friday 
Day -1 
0.1047 
[2.81***] 
0.0490 
[2.68] 
0.0557 
[1.34] 
Day 0 
0.3502 
[7.75***] 
0.3685 
[18.89***] 
-0.0183 
[-0.37] 
Day +1 
0.3272 
[7.30***] 
0.4143 
[23.82***] 
-0.0871 
[-1.81*] 
The table presents the average values, t-values in brackets, and number of observations in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level. 
 
Looking at the daily distribution, the acquirers of public targets exhibit a negative abnormal 
trading volume differential (Friday – non-Friday) over days 0 and +1 around the announcement 
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window. Day +1 seems to primarily be driving the effect (significant at the 10 % level). The 
differential is positive on day -1, but not statistically significant.  
For day -1 and publicly owned targets, the acquirers’ negative return differential and positive 
volume differential, are in the directions of possible preannouncement information leakage. 
This however seems unlikely, as neither of these differential values are statistically significant. 
As mentioned in Section 2.10, firms may seek to hasten the announcement of mergers and 
acquisitions, if there is concern of announcement information leakage.  
For the acquirers of targets with private status, the differentials (Friday – non-Friday) in average 
daily abnormal trading volumes, are positive for all days around the announcement window (-
1, +1). I.e. I do not notice a muted volume response, and none of the values are statistically 
significant. 
Considering the results, I get, I cannot fully replicate the results of Louis and Sun (2010). My 
results for abnormal returns are somewhat consistent with their findings. Here, of primary 
concern is that for the acquirers of privately owned targets, most of the negative Friday – non-
Friday average cumulative abnormal return differential is attributable to day +1. I.e. most of the 
muted market reaction is attributable to the following trading day. 
In regard to abnormal trading volumes, my results for the acquirers of privately owned targets 
do not support the investor distraction hypothesis. For announcements where the target’s status 
is public, there is a weak indication of a muted volume response, when comparing Fridays to 
the average of all other weekdays. Also here, most of the muted effect seems to be attributable 
to day +1, where the Friday – non-Friday differential value is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10 % level. This suggests that the strongest effect for the muted market 
reaction in regard to trading volumes and public targets, is realized during the next trading day, 
in most cases Monday.  
There are some differences in the methods I use to study abnormal trading volumes to those of 
Louis and Sun (2010). These can provide some explanation to our varying results. One 
difference is the way they have calculated daily abnormal trading volumes. This is defined, as 
the difference between the log of the market value of shares traded on the day of interest (e.g 
day 0), and the average log of the market value of shares traded, during the same weekday, and 
over the previous 4 weeks before the merger announcement date. I.e. they match the 
announcement weekdays’ trading volumes with the average trading volumes for the same 
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weekday over the 4-week period prior to the announcement. Thus, the benchmark log volume 
is not the same for all merger announcements and varies from the one I have used. 
Another difference is that I calculate abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1, as the 
average of the abnormal trading volume during these two days (defined in Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009)). Louis and Sun (2010) compute cumulative abnormal trading volumes as the sum 
of abnormal trading volumes over the two days (0, +1). This can also explain some of the 
variations in results. One could argue however, that if a slight change in methods produces 
weaker results, the prior results are not very robust. Yet, it should be remembered that my 
sample size is smaller to that of Louis and Sun (2010). 
The differences in results presents some questions. For example, are the omitted observations 
in my sample, driving the results of Louis and Sun (2010)? My sample size is smaller compared 
to theirs. I.e. it is for the most part a subsample of theirs. I cannot seem to derive as robust 
results as they have, especially, the direction and magnitude of results, in the case of the 
acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes for stock swaps involving privately owned targets. This 
implies that the Friday merger announcement effect might not be as strong as prior research 
suggests.   
One could also consider, whether my data gathering and methodologies have been robust 
enough. For the most part, the directions of the results are consistent with Louis and Sun (2010), 
the magnitudes differ however. Thus, I doubt I have made some grave errors in regard to these 
parts. 
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5.5 Multivariate analysis 
Some of the variation in the results between my univariate and multivariate tests, can be 
attributable to the omission of observations, with missing acquirers’ book values of equity. 
Thus, the difference in sample size, stems from the variable bm. In total 259 observations are 
omitted from the multivariate tests. 82 when target status is private, and 177 when target status 
is private. Also, my univariate t-tests for differences in means assume unequal variances, 
although assuming equal variances does not materially change the results. 
 
Table 13: Multivariate regression analysis for stock swap announcements 
and acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over days 0 and +1 
CARi = β0 + β1highnews + β2friday + β3lnsize + β4relsize + β5bm + εi 
 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
(N = 1222)  
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
(N = 1352) 
intercept 0.0313 
[2.48**]  
-0.0063 
[-0.68] 
highnews -0.0145 
[-1.81*]  
-0.0015 
[-0.27] 
friday -0.0224 
[-3.09***]  
0.0092 
[1.72*] 
lnsize -0.0021 
[-1.29]  
-0.0020 
[-1.92*] 
relsize 0.0484 
[4.48***]  
-0.0179 
[-3.96***] 
bm -0.0133 
[-1.68*]   
0.0153 
[2.85***] 
The intercept in the multivariate regression corresponds to the average acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return when announcing stock swap deals on non-high-news days and non-Fridays. 
CAR, the dependent variable, is the cumulative abnormal return over days 0 and +1 after the 
merger announcement. highnews is a binary variable taking 1 if the merger announcement is 
made on a high-news day, 0 otherwise. friday is a binary variable taking 1 if the merger 
announcement is made on a Friday, 0 otherwise. lnsize is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s 
market value of equity 20 days prior to the announcement. relsize is the ratio of the transaction’s 
total value to the acquirer’s market value of equity 20 days prior to the merger announcement; 
bm is the acquirer’s book-to-market value of equity at the end of the quarter prior to the merger 
announcement. The t-values are presented in square brackets.  
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My multivariate regression results for the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns, over the two 
days (0, +1) after the merger announcement, are similar to the results Louis and Sun (2010) 
obtain. Fridays exhibit a muted price reaction, when the target’s status is both private and 
public. I.e. the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns, are on average, less negative when the 
target’s status is private, and less positive when the target’s status is public. This relates to prior 
research, reporting that, on average, the market reacts positively (negatively) to stock swap 
announcements of privately (publicly) owned firms (Chang (1998); Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005); Louis (2005); Gong, Louis, and 
Sun (2008)). The effect seems to be more pronounced for private targets. This holds, after 
controlling for the variables highnews, lnsize, relsize and bm. 
As covered before, Fridays are very seldom categorized as high-news days in my sample. For 
the multivariate sample, and stock swaps involving privately owned targets, this occurs only 
for 7 out of 1 222 observations, 0.57 %. Respectively, when the target’s status is public the 
figure is even lower, 2 out of 1 352 observations, 0.15 %. Conversely, 29 out of 1 222 (2.4 %) 
and 27 out of 1 352 (2.0 %) of Friday observations are categorized as low-news days, when the 
target’s status is private and public. 
According to Louis and Sun (2010), compared to other days, the acquirer’s market value of 
equity tends to be higher for Friday stock swap announcements (differential not statistically 
significant). Respectively, the relative size of the total transaction value to the acquirer’s market 
value tends to be lower for Friday announcers (differential not statistically significant). Book-
to-market value of equity tends to be higher (differential statistically significant). 
Merger announcements on high-news days exhibit similar effects to those reported in the 
univariate tests. Compared to the univariate tests, the t-value for announcement effects in stock 
swaps involving privately owned targets increases (more negative), after including the control 
variables. There seems to be a muted price reaction for the aacquirers when the mergers involve 
private targets. My results for stock swaps involving publicly owned targets, show a negative, 
however not significant coefficient. This does not support the muted price response for 
acquirers announcing mergers on high-news days, in the same fashion that the results from my 
univariate tests suggest. 
The coefficient for lnsize is negative, when the target’s status is both private and public. I.e. 
when announcing stock-for-stock mergers, the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns around 
the event window (0,+1) are negatively affected, with increasing  bidders’ total market value of 
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equity. For stock swaps involving publicly owned targets, the coefficient for lnsize differs from 
the findings of Louis and Sun (2010), as they report a positive, however statistically 
insignificant coefficient (LSIZE). 
The coefficient for relsize is positive when the target’s status is private and negative for stock 
swaps involving publicly owned targets. This suggests that, in the case of public targets, the 
acquirers’ announcement period cumulative abnormal returns are negatively affected, when the 
relative size of the transaction increases. The opposite seems to hold when the target’s status is 
private. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Some prior research has been conducted on the topic. Scanlon et al. (1989) study the relative 
size of mergers and the impact they have on stock returns of the acquiring companies. The 
authors report that purchases of relatively large companies affect acquiring firms’ returns 
significantly more negative, when comparing with the rest of their sample. In their study, both 
acquiring and acquired firms are publicly traded. Louis (2004b) reports a statistically significant 
negative coefficient for relative size in regard to announcements of bank mergers. According 
to (Louis 2004a), the negative coefficient can be explained by smaller targets being more 
manageable (Chatterjee (1986)), and relatively large targets having a noticeable effect on 
acquirers’ stock returns. 
My results indicate a negative (positive) coefficient for bm, when the target’s status is private 
(public). Both values are statistically significant, but the effect is more pronounced for 
acquirers’ of publicly owned targets (1 % level significance). Thus, increases in acquirers’ 
book-to-market ratio seems to affect their cumulative abnormal returns negatively (positively) 
when announcing stock swap deals of privately (publicly) owned targets. 
Lang et al. (1989) report that acquirers with high Tobin’s q ratios exhibit significant positive 
abnormal return differentials compared to those with low q ratios, in successful tender offers 
during the time period 1968-1980. On average, bidders with low q ratios show negative 
abnormal returns. Their sample includes observations where both the target and bidder are 
publicly listed firms. Specifically, high q bidders of low q targets, show positive and statistically 
significant results compared to low q bidders of high q targets (Lang et al. (1989)). According 
to the authors this can explained by the market rewarding well managed firms taking over 
poorly managed firms. On average, their results indicate that announcement period returns are 
negative for low q acquirers of high q targets. Low q bidder/low q target and high q bidder/high 
q target exhibit positive, but not statistically significant coefficients to the negative intercept 
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term corresponding to low q bidder/high q target. Servaes (1991) extends the analysis of Lang 
et al. (1989) to cover both mergers and tender offers during the time period 1972-1987. The 
author reports similar results, i.e. that acquirers’ returns are on average larger, when acquirer 
(target) q ratio is higher (lower).  
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that the market is prone to overestimate the capabilities of 
low book-to-market (glamour) firms in managing acquisitions, based on overextrapolation of 
bidders’ past performance. Conversely, the market tends to be too pessimistic about the 
capabilities of high book-to-market (value) firms’ capabilities in managing acquisitions (Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998)). Managers of glamour firms also seem to be more prone to hubris in 
their expectations to manage acquisitions. Thus, they may not make as smart acquisitions as 
value firms, with higher scrutiny regarding managerial decisions and tighter constraints. In the 
long-run glamour acquirers seem to underperform compared to value acquirers. However, in 
the short-run glamour bidders returns seem to be much larger than value bidders around the 
announcement date. 
Based on my results for the coefficients of bm, I cannot verify the earlier findings. Tobin’s q 
ratio, is defined as total market value of firm divided by total asset value (replacement cost)17, 
similar to the price-to-book ratio – the inverse of book-to-market. Thus, I see an opposite effect 
for stock swap announcements, when the target’s status is public. The earlier findings are 
consistent with what I see, when target status is private. Perhaps the pattern I observe for bm in 
my multivariate analysis of CAR, is that the market reacts negatively to stock swap 
announcements involving publicly owned targets, when mergers are driven by acquirers’ 
overvalued equity. I.e. the use of stock in the merger can signal that the share price of the 
acquirer is overvalued. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose that overvalued bidders, who expect to see negative stock 
returns in the long-run, can use stock acquisitions in an attempt to make these returns less 
negative. Overvalued acquirers will also use stock as a means of payment in transactions, where 
the target is relatively less overvalued. Overall, cash (stock) acquisitions tend to exhibit positive 
(negative) long-run abnormal returns for acquirers, when the method of payment is considered 
(see e.g. Servaes (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997)). 
The model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) yields some interesting predictions overall. According 
to the authors, the proportion of stock acquisitions increases, when aggregate or industry 
                                                          
17 See e.g. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/qratio.asp 
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valuations are high, and with dispersion in valuations among firms. Despite underperforming 
compared to cash acquisitions, and negative long-run stock performance of acquirers, stock 
acquisitions can serve the interest of acquirers’ long-run shareholders. In stock acquisitions, 
bidders likely exhibit high prior returns to the announcement, and signs of overvaluation. 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model presumes that financial markets are inefficient, while 
managers are completely rational. In the authors’ words, “managers rationally respond to less-
than-rational markets” (Shleifer and Vishny (2003, p. 297) 
My results for bm could be explained, by the market being more efficient than that proposed in 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Overextrapolation of past results can lead to higher valuations of 
bidders, but when they announce a stock swap acquisition of a public target, they signal that it 
is optimal for the acquirer to use equity as a means of payment, even if the share price drops in 
the short-term. The expected long-run drop of the acquirer’s share price (from the firms’ point 
of view), could have been larger. I.e. my results for the association between CAR and bm, when 
the target’s status is public, could be explained by the market learning something from the 
corporate decision (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Perhaps markets are in some ways inefficient up until the stock swap merger announcement, 
but the investors realize that the firms’ equity is likely overvalued when the announcement is 
released. Thus, the constant for the multivariate regression should be negative, and the 
coefficient of bm positive. For example, it has been reported that stock-for-stock acquirers show 
signs of overvaluation, such as earnings manipulation and insider selling, prior to the 
announcement (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). See also Erickson and Wang (1999; Jenter 
(2002)). Correcting for possible earnings manipulation can be hard for investors, at least ex ante 
the firm signals something through a decision, or it is revealed that earnings have been 
manipulated. Also, Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that firms may take advantage of 
conditions by issuing equity when it is overvalued (IPOs, SEOs). The coefficient for bm, in the 
case of public bidders acquiring firms that are privately owned is negative (significant at the 10 
% level). If the explanation for acquirers’ abnormal returns, is as I have hypothesized above, 
then why should the case be different here? After all, in both cases the acquirers are publicly 
traded firms. This question is hard to answer. 
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Table 14: Multivariate regression analysis for stock swap announcements 
and acquirers' abnormal trading volumes (ATV) over days 0 and +1 
ATVi = β0 + β1highnews + β2friday + β3lnsize + β4relsize + β5bm + εi 
 
Stock swaps involving 
privately owned targets 
(N = 1222)  
Stock swaps involving 
publicly owned targets 
(N = 1352) 
intercept 0.1717 
[2.29**]  
0.4081 
[5.83***] 
highnews 0.0855 
[1.80*]  
-0.1147 
[-2.77***] 
friday 0.0127 
[0.29]  
-0.0786 
[-1.94*] 
lnsize -0.0157 
[-1.65*]  
-0.0182 
[-2.26**] 
relsize 0.5158 
[8.03***]  
0.4092 
[11.97***] 
bm 0.0544 
[1.16]   
-0.0072 
[-0.18] 
The intercept in the multivariate regression corresponds to the average acquirer abnormal 
trading volume when announcing stock swap deals on non-high-news days and non-Fridays. 
ATV, the dependent variable, is the abnormal trading volume over days 0 and +1 after the 
merger announcement. For the descriptions of other variable, see Table 13. The t-values are 
presented in square brackets. 
 
After controlling for other determinants, the t-values of highnews are close to those shown in 
my univariate tests. When the target’s status is private, the difference in the constant is slightly 
more positive (1,80>1,70) and statistically significant at the 10 % level. This does not support 
the hypothesis of a muted market reaction in regard to abnormal trading volumes on high-news 
days. The results indicate that acquirers’ average abnormal trading volume is larger on high-
news days.  
When the target’s status is public the difference in the constant is slightly less negative (-2,77>-
3,19), yet statistically significant at the 1 % level. Thus, after controlling for other variables, 
the results are similar to those I obtain in my univariate tests. Also friday, exhibits similar results 
to the ones I show in my univariate tests. However, the significance of the Friday effect seems 
to have increased, when the target’s status is public (-1,94<-1,24), now significant at the 10 % 
level. When the target’s status is private, the coefficient is still insignificant (0,29<0,56).  
69 
 
Lnsize has negative coefficient, when the target’s status is both private and public, and 
statistically significant at the 10 % and 5 % levels. Thus, when the acquirer’s market value of 
equity increases, abnormal trading volumes decrease. This seems intuitive. The coefficients for 
relsize are positive, for announcements involving both privately and publicly owned targets, 
and statistically significant at the 1 % level. When the relative size of the transactions increase, 
abnormal trading volumes increase. The coefficients for bm are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 15: Multivariate regression analysis for stock swap announcements 
and acquirers' abnormal trading volumes (ATV) over days 0 and +1 
ATVi = β0 + β1highnews + β2friday + β3lnsize + β4relsize + β5bm + εi 
 
All stock swaps involving 
privately and publicly owned targets 
(N = 2574) 
intercept 0.2318 
[4.76***] 
highnews -0.0199 
[-0.64] 
friday -0.0298 
[-1.01] 
public 0.1356 
[6.18***] 
lnsize -0.0183 
[-3,01***] 
relsize 0.4368 
[14,28***] 
bm 0.0214 
[0,69] 
The intercept in the multivariate regression corresponds to the average acquirer abnormal 
trading volume when announcing stock swap deals on non-high-news days and non-Fridays. 
ATV, the dependent variable, is the abnormal trading volume over days 0 and +1 after the 
merger announcement. public is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if target status is public, 
0 otherwise. For the descriptions of other variable, see Table 13. The t-values are presented in 
square brackets. 
 
For comparative purposes (Louis and Sun (2010)), I have also conducted a multivariate 
regression test, where all stock swap announcements are included, with the acquirers’ abnormal 
trading volumes over day 0 and +1 as the dependent variable. The main takeaway here, is the 
statistically significant - at the 1 % level - coefficient for the variable public. This indicates that, 
on average, the acquirers’ abnormal trading volumes increase significantly over days 0 and +1, 
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when announcing stock-for-stock mergers, where public companies are targets. This conclusion 
can indeed be derived from the earlier results. However, I have chosen to include it for 
additional clarification.  
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6. Discussion of the results 
This section provides further discussion of the results and the implications they carry. Also, it 
raises some concerns, over the feasibility of using the daily number of earnings announcements 
as a proxy for investor distraction in the context of stock swap merger announcements. 
A few interesting questions arise, in regard to the muted market reaction hypothesis for merger 
announcements on high-news days. Why are the high-news differentials in acquirers’ average 
cumulative abnormal returns over days 0 and +1 significant, when the target’s status is private, 
but not when the target’s status I public? Why are the high-news differentials in acquirers’ 
average abnormal trading volumes over days 0 and +1 significant, when the target’s status is 
public, but not when the target’s status I private? In fact, the positive abnormal trading volume 
differential for stock swap announcements involving privately owned targets, suggests that 
there is, on average, larger abnormal trading volume on high-news days. 
Overall, I gain some support for the investor distraction hypothesis on high-news days. Those 
results that are statistically significant in the univariate tests, hold in the multivariate tests. My 
univariate t-tests for mean differences, assume unequal variances. However, assuming equal 
variance does not materially affect the univariate results. 
My results for high-news day differentials, do not seem to be very robust on the whole. Also, 
when the target’s status is private, the highnews positive difference in the constant for the 
acquirers’ average abnormal trading volume still persist, after controlling for other variables. It 
is hard to rule out other unobserved determinants that could drive, help explain the results. 
Dispersion of opinions in regard to merger announcements, could explain some aspects of the 
results (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) report a negative correlation between public stock-
for-stock acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns, and proxies for information asymmetry 
and diversity of opinion. Specifically, this applies, when both acquirer and target status is 
public, and the medium of payment is equity. Idiosyncratic volatility is used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. Respectively, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts and breadth 
of ownership are used as proxies for diversity of opinion. The authors report that public bidders’ 
abnormal returns in stock-for-stock acquisitions of public companies decrease, when proxies 
for diversity of opinion increase. However, when idiosyncratic volatility is controlled for, the 
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proxies for diversity of opinion are not significant (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007)). 
Also, after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, the authors find no difference in abnormal 
returns between stock-for-stock acquisitions of public and private firms. The authors do not 
find a negative relation between public acquirers’ abnormal returns and diversity of opinion in 
stock swap acquisitions of private firms.   
Louis and Sun (2010) control for the proportion of institutional ownership (breadth of 
ownership) and the standard deviation of analysts’ long-term earnings forecasts (dispersion of 
opinion). The authors report a positive (significant at the 1 % level) correlation between the 
proportion of institutional ownership and abnormal trading volumes, when both public and 
private targets are included. Dispersion of opinion is negatively related to abnormal trading 
volumes, but not statistically significant in their tests.  
In regard to abnormal returns, both of the variables do not show statistically significant results 
when the target’s status is private. When the target’s status is public, the authors report negative 
and statistically significant values for both proportion of institutional ownership and diversity 
of opinion (statistically significant at 5 % and 1 % level respectively). I have not controlled for 
these variables, so it is hard to provide a definite answer of their possible effects, if they were 
included in my multivariate tests. However, the prior research conducted, does not seem to 
support the notion, that the mixed results I get for the acquirers’ stock swap announcement 
abnormal returns and trading volumes, could be explained by diversity of opinion, when private 
targets are involved. 
To calculate abnormal trading volumes, the turnover approach is perhaps more used. I.e. trading 
volume (e.g. daily) divided by total shares outstanding. I have chosen to use the market value 
of shares traded approach, defined in equation (3), due to DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), Louis and Sun (2010) using it. Using the turnover approach, 
could lead to some differences in results. However, the expectation is that it does not have a 
material effect. 
To gain some further insight, it could be worthwhile to study the high-news, low-news status 
of the days prior to and after the announcement (-1 and +1). This could help explain, some of 
the patterns I observe in the univariate tests. Further, what are the effects on abnormal trading 
volumes and returns, when multiple mergers are announced during the same day? I have not 
controlled for these determinants in my study. In regard to same day mergers, the size of the 
sample could also drop considerably, which poses a problem. 
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Either have I controlled for the effects of earnings surprises. Earnings surprises can be expected 
to receive heightened investor scrutiny, compared to “normal”, “regular” earnings 
announcements. For one, they resemble more merger announcements, in the way that they are 
to a higher degree unexpected events. If multiple earnings surprises occur during the same day, 
this could lead to decreased investor attention, a higher level of investor distraction. Thus, 
controlling for these factors could provide further insight to the proposed investor distraction 
hypothesis on high-news days. Similarly, as the t-values for the Friday coefficient drop 
somewhat in my multivariate tests, these could be of interest when studying the Friday effect 
as well. 
Since I for the most part, show similar yet less pronounced results for the Friday effect, as Louis 
and Sun (2010), I doubt I have made some errors in the collection of the data. However, also 
here, I cannot verify the hypothesized negative abnormal trading volume differential for 
Fridays. The omitted observations – likely to a large part those with CRSP share code 11 - in 
my sample, could explain the more pronounced and consistent results shown in Louis and Sun 
(2010). These observations can also be driving their results. Thus, it raises the question, whether 
their results are robust enough and hold for a subsample of their data? What possible other 
unobserved determinants might drive the differences in our results? 
There is an interesting new forthcoming paper by Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, 
forthcoming), suggesting that the observed muted market reaction effects on Fridays, to various 
corporate events and announcements, including mergers, are due to selection bias. According 
to the authors, firms that conduct Friday announcements have experienced muted market 
responses during other weekdays also, and seem to share common unobserved characteristics 
in regard to the type of announcement. I.e. common firm-specific characteristics across 
announcement types. Also, Shevlin and Thornock (2015) do not find support for reduced 
investor attention on Fridays, when studying releases of earnings announcements. 
After correcting for the selection bias, Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, forthcoming) 
find no support to the notion that investors are less attentive to corporate announcements during 
Fridays, compared to other weekdays. If their results hold, this could explain some aspects to 
the mixed results I receive, in regard to the hypothesized Friday effect. However, this does not 
provide further clarification on my mixed results in regard to the hypothesized investor 
distraction effect on high-news days.  
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Perhaps merger announcements, are in itself, such noteworthy news that a high-amount of 
distracting earnings news occurring on the same day, does not significantly draw attention away 
from the main headline, if you will. To gain support for the investor distraction hypothesis, 
(proxied by the amount of daily earnings announcements) in the context of merger 
announcements, my results should likely show a muted market response for both acquirers’ 
abnormal returns and trading volumes, and for transactions that involve both publicly and 
privately owned targets. This is not case, and thus I cannot verify the investor distraction 
hypothesis (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009)), on the whole, in the context of merger 
announcements. At the least, the analysis should be extended to include other proposed control 
variables. Further, to gain some insight about possible differences in long-run performance, 
abnormal performance could be calculated for e.g. the post-announcement window (2, 61). 
Also, an important point to consider is what amount of same day earnings announcements start 
causing investor distraction. I.e. the investor distraction effect does not necessarily increase 
steadily. Thus, the question arises, whether the non-high-news days’ group is a good control 
group? Investor distraction is presumably low during low-news days. Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009) use the top and bottom deciles for the number of same day earnings 
announcements, and I have followed their approach. I decided to select the non-high-news days 
group, to see if there is variation in the differences between high-news day merger 
announcements and low-news days/non-high-news days. The analysis provides some 
robustness to the results, but mainly not in the hypothesized direction. 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
Studying the possible muted market reaction to stock-for-stock merger announcements, I find 
partial evidence for this occurring on high-news days and Fridays. However, on the whole the 
results are not very robust, consistent over the whole sample, and in regard to both differential 
abnormal returns and trading volumes. As DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) note, if the muted price 
reaction (in their study, Friday and earnings announcements) is attributable to investor 
distraction, a muted volume reaction is also expected. Based on my results, I cannot 
consistently verify this. In the model of DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), if the muted price 
reaction is attributable to a higher degree in dispersion of opinion, larger abnormal trading 
volumes would be expected (on Fridays in their study). 
Summary in regard to the differential market reaction, between high-news days and low-news 
days/non-high-news days: 
Over days 0 and +1 around the announcement, and in regard to differential abnormal returns, I 
gain support for Hypothesis 1 (at the 10 % significance level), but not for Hypothesis 2. As for 
abnormal trading volumes, I gain support for Hypothesis 4 (1 % significance level), but not for 
Hypothesis 3. In fact, my results related to Hypothesis 3 are in the opposite direction of what is 
expected, and statistically significant at the 10 % level. These results remain after controlling 
for size, relative size, and book-to-market in my multivariate tests.  
Additionally, the differences in mean abnormal returns and trading volumes, between high-
news days and low-news days, and between high-news days and non-high-news days, do not 
show a consistent pattern in line with the investor distraction hypothesis. In some cases, the 
statistically significant differential market reactions occur during day +1 after the merger 
announcement. Thus, this does not robustly support the expectation of a muted market reaction 
on day 0, i.e. a high distraction day, proxied by the daily number of earnings announcements. 
Summary in regard to the differential market reaction, between Fridays and non-Fridays: 
Over the two-day window around the announcement (days 0 and +1), differences in mean 
abnormal returns provide support for Hypotheses 5 and 6 - statistically significant at 1 % and 
10 % level. In regard to differences in abnormal trading volumes, I gain slight support for 
Hypothesis 8, but not for Hypothesis 7. Overall the results are similar after controlling for 
additional variables in my multivariate tests. Here, the results in regard to Hypothesis 8, become 
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statistically significant at the 10 % level. Also, with regard to the Friday muted effect, it is of 
concern that in some cases the statistically significant differentials seem to occur on day +1 
after the merger announcement. 
The main contribution of this study, to the existing literature, is that the daily number of 
earnings announcements might not be a very good proxy for investor distraction, in the context 
of merger announcements. I do receive partial support for my hypotheses, but to gain further 
insight on the matter the analysis should be extended. Also, it raises some questions over the 
robustness of the results that Louis and Sun (2010) report. As Shevlin and Thornock (2015), 
and Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko (2015, forthcoming) present, the proposed muted market 
response to Friday announcements, is still under debate. For future studies, it could be 
worthwhile to consider including some of the factors mentioned in Section 6. This would shed 
more light on the topic of limited investor attention and its role in regard to one of the largest 
corporate announcements, namely stock swap merger announcements. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure 2: Yearly distribution for stock swaps involving all targets 1994-2014 
 
 
Figure 3: Yearly distribution for stock swaps involving publicly owned targets 1994-2014 
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Figure 4: Yearly distribution for stock swaps involving privately owned targets 1994-2014 
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Appendix 2 
Table 16: Daily distribution of the merger announcement sample 1994-2006 
Panel A: Distribution for public targets (N = 1 302) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
384 266 241 232 179 
Percentage of 
the sample 
29.49 % 20.43 % 18.51 % 17.82 % 13.75 % 
Panel B: Distribution for private targets (N = 1 194) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
261 287 232 229 185 
Percentage of 
the sample 
21.86 % 24.04 % 19.43 % 19.18 % 15.49 % 
Panel C: Distribution for all targets (N = 2 496) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
645 553 473 461 364 
Percentage of 
the sample 
25.84 % 22.16 % 18.95 % 18.47 % 14.58 % 
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Appendix 3 
Table 17: Daily distribution of the merger announcement sample 2007-2014 
Panel A: Distribution for public targets (N = 227) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
70 42 43 45 27 
Percentage of 
the sample 
30.84 % 18.50 % 18.94 % 19.82 % 11.89 % 
Panel B: Distribution for private targets (N = 110) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
31 21 20 26 12 
Percentage of 
the sample 
28.18 % 19.09 % 18.18 % 23.64 % 10.91 % 
Panel C: Distribution for all targets (N = 337) 
 Announcement day 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Number of 
observations 
101 63 63 71 39 
Percentage of 
the sample 
29.97 % 18.69 % 18.69 % 21.07 % 11.57 % 
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